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INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE 9/11 PROBLEM
On December 19, 2008, the Convening Authority for the United
States Military Commissions at Guantanamo Bay referred charges against
Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Abdu Al-Nashiri for his role in the
October 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. The charge sheet alleged that
al-Nashiri committed several acts—including murder in violation of the
law of war, perfidy, destruction of property—”in the context of and associ-
ated with armed conflict”1 on or about October 12, 2000 in connection
with the bombing. At the time of the attack, the statement that the United
States was engaged in an armed conflict would have been a surprise to
many. The Cole bombing was routinely called a “terrorist attack” and the
U.S. response involved numerous parallel investigations into, inter alia:
identifying and finding those responsible for the attack; reviewing the ac-
tions of the commanding officer and crew of the U.S.S. Cole; and examin-
ing the vulnerabilities of U.S. forces abroad.2 And yet, in the aftermath of
the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. military response to those attacks, many—
including the U.S. government before the military commissions—argued
that the Cole bombing was “one of the opening salvos of the terrorist war
on Americans”3 and therefore part of the U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda.
A look at these differing approaches to characterizing the U.S.S. Cole
bombing and where it falls along the timeline of U.S. counterterrorism
operations and contemporary armed conflicts highlights a significant un-
1. Charge Sheet at 3, 7, United States v. al-Nashiri, M.C. (2008) (AE001).
2. See, e.g., Lessons Learned from the Attack on U.S.S. Cole, on the Report of the
Crouch-Gehman Commission, and on the Navy’s Judge Advocate General Manual Investiga-
tion into the Attack, Including a Review of Appropriate Standards of Accountability for U.S.
Military Services: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 107th Cong. (2001).
3. Steve Vogel, The Ship that Terror Didn’t Stop; After Months of Repairs, USS Cole
Returns to Norfolk, Ready to Fight, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2002, at A1.
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certainty in our current understanding of the U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda:
the question of when the conflict started. Most Americans would not have
answered “yes” if asked whether the United States was at war in 2000—
but the rhetorical concept of a “war on terror” has created a different
perspective for some who now view pre-9/11 terrorist attacks, including
the Cole bombing and the 1998 Embassy bombings in Kenya and
Tanzania, as part of a coherent conflict. Similarly, our perspective on 9/11
itself, looking back thirteen years hence, is not necessarily the same as it
was on the day of the attacks regarding whether America is at war. Many
people doubtlessly felt that America was at war upon hearing of and see-
ing the attacks, but not in the manner or degree that Americans feel, or
have been told, that we are in the years since that day. Uncertainty reigns
over when this conflict actually started: did it begin on 9/11? When the
United States launched its response in October 2001? With the bombing of
the U.S.S. Cole? The 1998 Embassy bombings? With Osama bin Laden’s
1996 declaration of war? Earlier than that? A complicated web of opera-
tional authority, prosecutorial decisions, and legal analysis has left this
question unanswered and significantly murkier than might be expected.
Since the fall of 2001, the United States has asserted that it is engaged
in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces. The existence of
an armed conflict triggers the application of the law of armed conflict
(LOAC), with its attendant authorities and obligations. These authorities
include the use of lethal force as a first resort against enemy personnel,4
the detention of captured enemy personnel until the end of hostilities
without charge,5 and the trial of such persons for violations of the law of
armed conflict, including by military commission or other military tribu-
nals.6 The concomitant obligations include the protection of civilians from
deliberate and excessive incidental harm during conflict,7 the mandate to
4. Geoffrey S. Corn, Back to the Future: De Facto Hostilities, Transnational Terror-
ism, and the Purpose of the Law of Armed Conflict, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1345, 1352–53 (2009)
(“[A]rmed conflict is defined by the authority to use deadly force as a measure of first
resort.”).
5. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] (describing various prisoner of
war categories); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, arts. 42, 78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV] (per-
mitting internment).
6. See GC III, supra note 5, arts. 84, 99–108.
7. LOAC prohibits both deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians through a
comprehensive web of protections. First, the principle of distinction mandates that all parties
to a conflict distinguish between those who are fighting and those who are not and that
parties only target those who are fighting. In addition, fighters, including soldiers, must dis-
tinguish themselves from innocent civilians. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol I) art. 48, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. Article
51(2) of AP I prohibits deliberate attacks on civilians (“The civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”). Articles 51(4) and (5) also
prohibit indiscriminate attacks on civilians, which include attacks that violate the principle of
proportionality. The principle of proportionality states that parties must refrain from attacks
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provide humane treatment to all persons detained during the course of the
conflict,8 and the provision of fundamental fair trial rights to those prose-
cuted for violations during conflict.9
The past thirteen years have been marked by contentious and exten-
sive debates regarding whether and how LOAC applies to the conflict be-
tween the United States and al-Qaeda and, in particular, how we should or
must characterize individuals in the course of the conflict.10 Those deter-
minations, of course, drive the rights and protections such individuals have
and the range of options available to the United States in combatting the
threat from al-Qaeda and holding accountable those who have harmed
U.S. persons and interests. Although the Bush and Obama Administra-
tions have taken somewhat different approaches to the parameters of that
conflict, the reliance on the existence of an armed conflict has remained
unwavering.11 This characterization of the U.S. struggle against al-Qaeda
and other terrorist groups as an armed conflict is not universally accepted,
where the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in relation to the anticipated military
advantage. Id. at 51(5)(b).
8. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [herein-
after GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; GC III, supra note 5, art. 3; GC IV, supra note 5, art. 3.
Article 3 appears in an identical form in each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and is,
therefore, referred to as “Common Article 3.”
9. See, e.g., GC III, supra note 5, arts. 99, 105–07; GC IV, supra note 5, arts. 71–73;
AP I, supra note 7, art. 75.
10. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law,
and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 679–80 (2004);
Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A “Principled” Ap-
proach to the Regulation of Counterterror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV. 46, 49–50
(2009); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror, 36 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 349, 352–55 (2004); Steven R. Ratner, Are the Geneva Conventions Out of
Date?, 48 LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES (Univ. of Michigan Law Sch., Ann Arbor, Mich.), Sum-
mer 2005, at 66, 69–70; Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law:
Challenges from the “War on Terror,” 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 2003, at
55, 60–61; Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of
Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 499, 502-03 (2005).
11. All three branches of the U.S. government have demonstrated that they view the
situation as an armed conflict. See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 50
U.S.C. 1541 § 2(a) (2001); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Military Order, Deten-
tion, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (stating that the September 11 attacks “created a state of armed
conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces”); Department of Defense
Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain
Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (showing Executive Branch action);
see also Reply of the Government of the United States of America to the Report of the Five
UNCHR Special Rapporteurs on Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 10 (2006), available
at http://www.asil.org/ pdfs/ilib0603212.pdf (“The United States is engaged in a continuing
armed conflict against Al Qaida, the Taliban and other terrorist organizations supporting
them, with troops on the ground in several places engaged in combat operations.”).
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either in the United States or abroad,12 but the debate regarding whether
a state can be in an armed conflict with a terrorist group operating trans-
nationally falls outside the scope of this article. Rather, this Article focuses
on a question often skipped over in the course of the debate: assuming
there is an armed conflict, exactly when did that conflict start and how
should the events that triggered the conflict be characterized and
identified?
The military commissions prosecuting individuals at Guantanamo Bay
are tribunals constituted under LOAC and only have jurisdiction to try
violations of LOAC.13 As a result, in order to prosecute al-Nashiri, the
prosecution must allege crimes committed during an armed conflict—
which means that the prosecution must assert that there was an armed
conflict at the time of the U.S.S. Cole bombing in October 2000. Similarly,
in order to prosecute Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other 9/11 at-
tackers, the prosecution must assert that the crimes committed on Septem-
ber 11, 2001 were committed during an armed conflict.14 Beyond the
question of whether there is indeed an armed conflict between the United
States and al-Qaeda, which is of course relevant to the jurisdictional au-
thority of the military commissions overall, the question of precisely when
the conflict started is directly relevant to the ability to prosecute crimes
occurring on or before 9/11.
This Article explores how to identify the starting point of a non-inter-
national armed conflict, based on the challenges posed by the U.S. conflict
with al-Qaeda. Although the Geneva Conventions and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary to the Conventions de-
fine the start of international armed conflict—a conflict between two
states—and provide guidance as to the identification of non-international
armed conflict, neither the Conventions nor the interpretive Commentary
offer a methodology for isolating the start of the latter type of conflict.
Furthermore, it is only in few non-international armed conflicts, histori-
cally or ongoing, that we see a particular start identified; rather, the legal
analytical process tends to focus on the identification of conflict itself dur-
ing one or more timeframes.15 And yet accountability for violations of
12. See Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to al Qaeda, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 759,
760 (2007); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors through a
Global War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 445–46 (2005); Christopher
Greenwood, War, Terrorism and International Law, 56 CURR. LEG. PROBS. 505, 529 (2004).
13. Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) (2012) (Offenses are triable
by military commission “only if the offense is committed in the context of and associated with
hostilities.”).
14. Charge Sheet, United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, M.C. (2008). Charges
2–8 allege crimes committed on September 11, 2001. Id. at 17–19. Charges 1 and 9, on the
other hand, allege crimes committed between 1996 and 2001. Id. at 1–17, 20.
15. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment (Mar. 14,
2012); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to
the United Nations Secretary General, 25 January 2005, ¶¶ 74–76; Report of the Secretary
General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2001, ¶ 30. For an
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LOAC rests on the existence of an armed conflict at the time of the viola-
tions, making a precise determination essential in certain cases. Uncer-
tainty about the start of conflict can produce operational complexities with
regard to the assertion of wartime authorities in the targeting and deten-
tion arenas as well. Although this Article recognizes that a singular meth-
odology for the identification of precise start dates for non-international
armed conflict may not be possible in many situations, it examines the
various options for doing so and seeks to clarify, as much as possible, this
important but often overlooked question. In addition, the instant analysis
questions whether a state can, in effect, “claw back” the start of conflict
for the purposes of accountability, as the United States is attempting to do
with the assertion of LOAC accountability for acts on September 11, 2001;
in October 2000, nearly a year before the 9/11 attacks; and even conduct as
far back as 1996.16
Part I of this Article explains the basic legal regime governing the
identification and characterization of armed conflict, whether interna-
tional or non-international, and highlights the differences between inter-
national and non-international armed conflicts with respect to the
triggering of the law of armed conflict. Part II then applies this paradigm
for identifying the start of conflict to the U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda to
flesh out the appropriate mechanism for pinpointing the start of the con-
flict. After detailing the various approaches to dating the conflict, Part II
considers three options for marking the start of the conflict: (1) the now-
predominant Tadic´ factors of intensity and organization;17 (2) the non-
state group’s attack as the start of the conflict; or (3) the state’s declaration
of the existence of a conflict. The latter two options introduce, in essence,
a unilateral trigger for non-international armed conflict that is not part of
any existing framework for the recognition of non-international armed
conflict. Part II concludes by examining the impact of both operational
realities and extraterritorial conflicts on this legal analysis of conflict trig-
ger. Finally, Part III addresses the question of “clawback” and ties the
identification of the start of conflict to the fundamental purposes of both
LOAC and accountability for violations in order to explore whether rede-
fining the start of conflict for accountability purposes is a valid
methodology.
overview of the conflict recognition paradigm for non-international armed conflicts, see gen-
erally Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law and
the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 693 (2013).
16. Government Response to Defense Motion to Dismiss Because The Convening Au-
thority Exceeded His Power In Referring This Case To A Military Commission at 2, United
States v. Al Nashiri, M.C. (2012).
17. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 37–40 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008); Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment,
¶ 84; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 620 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prose-
cutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 561–68 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Mo-
tion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 66–70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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Just as the characterization and recognition of conflict is in many ways
a fluid process that demands a case-by-case analysis of many factors and
considerations, the identification of the start of conflict may not be suscep-
tible to concretization and firm rules. Nonetheless, the failure to examine
this issue more closely and seek greater clarity regarding the start of con-
flict has opened the door to wildly fluctuating versions of conflict triggers
and great uncertainty with regard to jurisdiction over LOAC violations
and the assertion of wartime authorities. This Article provides tools for
more effective analysis of the start of conflict and greater clarity in future
situations.
I.  CONFLICT RECOGNITION
LOAC—otherwise known as the law of war or international humani-
tarian law—governs the conduct of both states and individuals during
armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by protecting per-
sons not participating in hostilities and by restricting the means and meth-
ods of warfare.18 Historically, LOAC treaty and customary law applied to
situations of declared war between states.19 The classical definition of war
appears in Oppenheim’s treatise on international law: “war is a contention
between two or more States through their armed forces, for the purpose of
overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the
victor pleases.”20 Although the definition of war seemed obvious, this par-
adigm left open multiple possibilities for states to argue that LOAC–and
its relevant obligations–were not applicable because there was no declared
war.21 Recognizing that all possible arguments for denying the applicabil-
ity of LOAC to conflict had to be eliminated, the drafters of the Geneva
18. What is International Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, (July
31, 2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/legal-fact-sheet/humanitarian-law-
factsheet.htm. The law of armed conflict is codified primarily in the four Geneva Conven-
tions of August 14, 1949 and their Additional Protocols. GC I, supra note 8; GC II, supra
note 8; GC III, supra note 5; GC IV, supra note 5; AP I, supra note 7; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter AP II].
19. See, e.g., Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art.
2, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (stating that the annexed Regulations on the Laws and Customs
of War on Land applied “in case of war”).
20. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (7th ed. 1952).
21. For example, during World War II, the Japanese claimed that LOAC did not gov-
ern their operations in China and Manchuria because they were merely “police operations”
or “incidents,” an argument roundly rejected by the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment of 4 November 1948,
at 490. Similarly, Adolf Hitler rejected the application of LOAC to the conflict between Ger-
many and the Soviet Union because the latter did not have a legitimate right to the law’s
protections, pronouncing that “the war against Russia . . . is one of ideologies and racial
differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting
harshness. . . . German soldiers guilty of breaking international law . . . will be excused.”
WILLIAM SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI GER-
MANY 830 (1990).
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Conventions created a framework based on an objective analysis of the
relevant situation of violence, not the claims or goals of the parties to the
conflict. Furthermore, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 use the term
“armed conflict” rather than the more traditional term “war.” As the
Commentary to the Geneva Conventions explains,
[this] substitution . . . was deliberate. It is possible to argue almost
endlessly about the legal definition of “war”. A State which uses
arms to commit a hostile act against another State can always
maintain that it is not making war, but merely engaging in a police
action, or acting in legitimate self-defence. The expression “armed
conflict” makes such arguments less easy.22
Defining armed conflict is therefore the essential prerequisite to the appli-
cation of LOAC.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions endeavor to address all instances of
armed conflict and set forth two primary categories of armed conflict that
trigger the application of LOAC: (1) international armed conflict and (2)
non-international armed conflict. International armed conflict is conflict
between or among two or more states, and non-international armed con-
flict refers to conflicts between a state and one or more non-state armed
groups or among such non-state groups. The definition of armed conflict
for each type of conflict is not the same, creating different triggers for the
application of LOAC. This Part analyzes the definitions of international
armed conflict and non-international armed conflict, the triggering mecha-
nisms for each type of conflict, and the reasons for the difference between
those triggers in order to provide a foundation for the analysis in Parts II
and III below.
A. International Armed Conflict
Common Article 2 to the four Geneva Conventions defines the appli-
cation of the Geneva Conventions, stating that “the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”23 Although
Common Article 2 does not specifically define the term “armed conflict,”
it is understood to apply to any situation in which the armed forces of two
states engage with each other. No matter how short-lived or minor, any
hostilities between the armed forces of two or more states constitute an
international armed conflict, even if one or both states deny the existence
of an armed conflict.24
22. INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (III) REL-
ATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 23 (Oscar M. Uhler & Henri Coursier
eds., 1958), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-III.pdf [herein-
after GC III Commentary].
23. GC I, supra note 8, at art. 2; GC II, supra note 8, at art. 2; GC III, supra note 5, at
art. 2; GC IV, supra note 5, at art. 2.
24. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 23.
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Thus, for example, the Iranian detention of fifteen British sailors in
the Persian Gulf in March 200725 triggered the law of international armed
conflict and the Third Geneva Convention governed the treatment of the
detained sailors. The fact that neither the United Kingdom nor Iran recog-
nized a state of war or the existence of an armed conflict had no bearing
on the application of LOAC. The Commentary clarifies that even if both
states deny the existence of an armed conflict, the Geneva Conventions
still apply based objectively on the de facto situation: “[e]ven in that event
it would not appear that they could, by tacit agreement, prevent the Con-
ventions from applying. It must not be forgotten that the Conventions
have been drawn up first and foremost to protect individuals, and not to
serve State interests.”26 Similarly, when Syrian forces shot down and cap-
tured U.S. Navy Lt. Bobby Goodman in 1983 when he was flying a bomb-
ing mission in support of U.S. peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, Syria
treated him as a prisoner of war, as the United States demanded.27 The
engagement between Syria and the United States was extraordinarily
brief, but nonetheless qualified as an international armed conflict so as to
trigger the application of LOAC.
B. Non-International Armed Conflict
Before 1949, international law did not apply in a comprehensive man-
ner to conflicts inside the boundaries of a state—whether between the
state and a rebel group or among rebel groups fighting for control of the
state. The first half of the twentieth century saw a growing recognition that
the very protections LOAC guarantees to those engaged in and caught up
in international armed conflicts should not be denied to those enmeshed in
internal conflicts.28 As a result, the drafters of the Geneva Conventions
25. Sarah Lyall, Iran Detains British Sailors in Waters Off Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/23/world/middleeast/23cnd-basra.html?_r=0.
26. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 23.
27. Terry A. Anderson, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 31 1983 (“Syria says it considers
Goodman a prisoner of war and will release him only ‘after the war is over.’”). Geoffrey S.
Corn, “To Be or Not To Be, That is the Question”: Contemporary Military Operations and the
Status of Captured Personnel, ARMY LAWYER, June 1999, at 1, 5; Excerpts from Interview
with Syrian Defense Minister, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 30, 1983; Steven Dornfeld, Jackson
Leaves for Syria to Seek Airman’s Freedom, The Miami Herald, Dec. 30, 1983, at 11A; Red
Cross Visits Flier Being Held by Syrians, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1983, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/1983/12/09/world/red-cross-visits-flier-being-held-by-syrians.html.
28. INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (IV) REL-
ATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN TIME OF WAR 26 (Oscar M. Uhler & Henri
Coursier eds., 1958) [hereinafter GC IV COMMENTARY] (“Born on the battlefield, the
Red Cross called into being the First Geneva Convention to protect wounded or sick military
personnel. Extending its solicitude little by little over other categories of war victims, in logi-
cal application of its fundamental principle, it pointed the way, first to the revision of the
original Convention, and then to the extension of legal protection in turn to prisoners of war
and civilians. The same logical process could not fail to lead to the idea of applying the
principle in ‘all’ cases of armed conflicts, including those of an internal character.”). II-B
FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA, 79 (1951) [hereinafter FINAL
RECORD 1951] (“Civil wars sometimes leave the most painful wounds in the organism of
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took the groundbreaking step of codifying legal principles applicable in
non-international armed conflicts for the first time, in Common Article 3
of the four Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3 sets forth a minimum
threshold of treatment and conduct applicable “in the case of armed con-
flict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties.”29 The fundamental protections in Common
Article 3—prohibition on violence to life, torture, degrading treatment,
and arbitrary detention for all persons not taking an active part in hostili-
ties, including those who are hors de combat—thus provide a baseline of
protection in conflicts that do not fall within the definition of international
armed conflict in Common Article 2. The inclusion of these protections for
non-international armed conflicts was a direct response to the brutality
associated with internal wars and, as the Commentary explains,
at least ensures the application of the rules of humanity which are
recognized as essential by civilized nations and provides a legal
basis for interventions by the International Committee of the Red
Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization—inter-
ventions which in the past were all too often refused on the
ground that they represented intolerable interference in the inter-
nal affairs of a State.30
Over the past six decades, the international community has steadily
expanded and reinforced the application of LOAC to non-international
armed conflicts for the critical purpose of mitigating the suffering such
conflicts engender and ensuring accountability for those who violate the
law.31
Over time, Common Article 3 has been understood as establishing
LOAC’s minimum protections for all situations of armed conflict, not only
internal conflicts. As important as this development has been for the appli-
cation and enforcement of LOAC, it is equally important to recognize that
LOAC does not apply to situations that do not rise to the level of an
armed conflict. Thus, “not all forms of armed violence are considered as
‘armed conflicts’ under international humanitarian law.”32 Internal distur-
bances and tensions—such as riots, looting and “act[s] of banditry”33—do
not constitute armed conflict and therefore do not trigger the application
nations and their healing is most difficult; it was the well-conceived interest of the Parties to
the conflict, and above them of the country which they desired to serve, to reduce the ex-
cesses and horrors of such conflicts to the greatest possible extent.”).
29. Common Article 3, supra note 8.
30. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 35.
31. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 96-129 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995) (discussing the steady expansion of fundamental LOAC rules and protections
into the realm of non-international armed conflict).
32. Arne Willy Dahl & Magnus Sandbu, The Threshold of Armed Conflict, 45 MIL. L.
& L. WAR REV. 369, 370 (2006).
33. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 36.
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of LOAC.34 As a result, identifying the threshold for non-international
armed conflict remains an important issue at both the operational level
and in the accountability phase: LOAC obligations are triggered by the
existence of a conflict, so parties must have guidance for identifying that
trigger; and LOAC violations can only be prosecuted if committed during
armed conflict, so accountability will often rest on the existence of a
conflict.
The drafters of the Geneva Conventions recognized the significance of
this LOAC trigger in negotiating and drafting the language of Common
Article 3 and ultimately settled on a broad approach that would maximize
the protective function of Common Article 3 and the then nascent law of
non-international armed conflict. According to the Commentary, identify-
ing a specific test for determining the applicability of Common Article 3
was both impracticable and undesirable; instead, the Commentary pro-
posed a totality of the circumstances analysis designed to enable Common
Article 3’s underlying humanitarian objectives.35 To this end, the Com-
mentary provides a series of indicative—but not dispositive—factors or
characteristics of a Common Article 3 conflict, based on the nature and
behavior of both state and non-state parties. For example, the response of
the state is a critical component, in particular whether it employs its regu-
lar armed forces in combating the non-state actor and whether it has rec-
ognized the non-state actor as a belligerent.36 In addition, several
considerations can provide useful guidance for understanding whether vio-
lence or hostilities have progressed beyond internal disturbances, such as
whether the non-state actor (1) has an organized military force; (2) has an
authority responsible for its acts; (3) acts within a determinate territory,
having the means of ensuring respect for the Geneva Conventions; and (4)
acts as a de facto governing entity, and its armed forces are prepared to
obey the laws of war.37 These factors or considerations are not a set of
34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(d), 8(2)(f), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judg-
ment, ¶ 562.
35. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 36.
36. Id. at 35-6; see also Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser. L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 155 (Nov. 18, 1997), available at http://
www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/Argentina11137.htm (noting that one consideration in
finding the existence of an armed conflict was that the President “ordered that military action
be taken to recapture the base and subdue the attackers”); Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law
Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILI-
TARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 17 (Michael Lewis et al. eds., 2009); Dahl & Sandbu, supra note 32
(emphasizing the importance of the state’s use of military force as a factor in conflict
recognition).
37. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 35–36. None of these factors is dispositive;
rather, these and other factors may be used to distinguish acts of banditry, short-lived insur-
rection, or terrorist acts from armed conflict. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lukic´, Case No. IT-98-
32/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 879–888 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009)
(applying different and overlapping factors to determine whether an armed conflict existed);
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 84
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elements that must be checked off or a firm test. The Commentary ex-
plains that the idea of defining the term “conflict” was abandoned after
some debate, as was the inclusion of a list of “a certain number of condi-
tions on which the application of the Convention would depend.”38
Rather, as explained above, the drafters intended Common Article 3 to
have as broad a scope as possible.39
In the absence of a specific definition of armed conflict in the Geneva
Conventions, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) provided the now predominant defini-
tion of armed conflict. In Prosecutor v. Tadic´, in response to a defense
challenge attacking the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber de-
clared that an armed conflict exists whenever “there is a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State.”40 This definition has not only been the driving factor in the ICTY’s
jurisprudence, but was also adopted by the drafters of the Rome Statute
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC),41 by the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),42 and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone. Expounding on this definition in the merits phase of Tadic´,
the ICTY Trial Chamber elaborated on the broad guidelines in the defini-
tion above as follows:
The test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of an
armed conflict for the purposes of the rules contained in Common
Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the
conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict. In an
armed conflict of an internal or mixed character, these closely re-
lated criteria are used solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of
distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-
94-1-I, Decision of Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Sylvain Vite´, Typology of Armed Con-
flicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 69, 76–7 (2009).
38. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 35.
39. Id.
40. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶; see also INT’L LAW ASS’N [ILA], THE HAGUE CONFERENCE: FINAL REPORT
ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2010) (noting that the
Tadic´ decision is “widely cited for its description of the characteristics of armed conflict”)
[hereinafter ILA REPORT]; Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Inter-
nal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 98 (2005).
41. Rome Statute, supra note 33, art. 8(2)(f) (defining non-international armed con-
flicts as conflicts “that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed
conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups.”).
42. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 619–620 (Sept. 2,
1998) (citing the Tadic´ criteria for determining the existence of an armed conflict).
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short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not sub-
ject to international humanitarian law.43
The Tadic´ definition quickly became the determinative statement on
what constitutes armed conflict. Subsequent cases at the ICTY, as well as
other cases at the ICTR, the ICC, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
relied on the definition of armed conflict as protracted violence between
the government and organized armed groups or between two or more
armed groups as the paradigm for identifying the existence of an armed
conflict.44 Over time, the factors highlighted in the initial Tadic´ merits de-
cision—intensity and organization—have become the international com-
munity’s foundational framework for analyzing the existence of non-
international armed conflict.45
In a variety of cases, the ICTY has highlighted key factual information
that helps to demonstrate the intensity of fighting, such as the number,
duration, and intensity of individual confrontations; the types of weapons
and other military equipment used; the number of persons and types of
forces engaged in the fighting; the geographic and temporal distribution of
clashes; the territory that has been captured and held; the number of casu-
alties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians flee-
ing combat zones.46 Frequency of confrontations and the involvement of
the UN Security Council also prove to be indicative of intensity for the
43. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 562.
44. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Martic´, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 41 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007) (quoting the Tadic´ definition of armed con-
flict); Prosecutor v. Halilovic´, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 160–73 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005) (considering the facts and determining that an
armed conflict existed in the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina); Prosecutor v. Kordiæ,
Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 24 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26,
2001) (applying the Tadic´ definition of armed conflict); Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-
96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 327 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (apply-
ing the “control test” from Tadic´); Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 603.
45. See, e.g., ILA REPORT, supra note 40, at 2–3 (“At least two characteristics are
found with respect to all armed conflict: 1.) The existence of organized armed groups; 2.)
Engaged in fighting of some intensity . . . . For non-state actors to move from chaotic violence
to being able to challenge the armed forces of a state requires organization, meaning a com-
mand structure, training, recruiting ability, communications, and logistical capacity. Such or-
ganized forces are only recognized as engaged in armed conflict when fighting between them
is more than a minimal engagement or incident.”).
46. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia April 3, 2008); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T,
Judgment, ¶¶ 135–43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005 Tadic´, Case
No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 564–565; see also Prosecutor v. Mrks˘ic´, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T,
Judgment, ¶ 407 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007) (summarizing
the Tribunal’s overall approach to the intensity factor as: “Relevant for establishing the in-
tensity of a conflict are, inter alia, the seriousness of attacks and potential increase in armed
clashes, their spread over territory and over a period of time, the increase in the number of
government forces, the mobilisation and the distribution of weapons among both parties to
the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has attracted the attention of the United Nations
Security Council, and if so whether any resolutions on the matter have been passed.”).
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purposes of identifying an armed conflict.47 Additional relevant factors
often noted include the collective nature of the fighting, the state’s resort
to its armed forces, the duration of the conflict, and the frequency of the
acts of violence and military operations.48
Similarly, with regard to organization, cases have focused on a range
of information about the groups involved in the conflict, such as whether
they employ a hierarchical structure; the extent of their territorial control
and administration; their ability to recruit and train combatants; their abil-
ity to launch operations using military tactics; their ability to enter peace
or cease-fire agreements; their ability to issue internal regulations; and
their ability to coordinate multiple units.49
Although early cases focused on whether the hostilities involved at
least two sides fighting against each other, without too much further de-
tail,50 as the ICTY’s jurisprudence evolved, organization began to be un-
derstood as a strictly independent requirement, analyzed as a series of
factors. For example, the Bos˘koski case sets forth five categories of factors
for identifying the relevant organization: (1) factors signaling the presence
of a command structure, (2) factors indicating the ability to carry out mili-
tary operations in an organized manner, (3) factors indicating a level of
logistics, (4) factors relevant to whether the group has sufficient discipline
to implement the LOAC, and (5) factors demonstrating that the group can
speak with “one voice.”51 Other useful metrics for examining the organi-
zation of parties to a conflict can include, as suggested by the ICRC, the
authority to launch attacks bringing together different units and the exis-
tence or promulgation of internal rules.52
47. See Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49; Vite´, supra note 37, at 76–77
(discussing a range of indicators of armed conflict beyond those referenced in the text above,
including the government’s response and the collective nature of the fighting); see also Prose-
cutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶¶ 34–40 (Mar. 14, 2012).
48. Vite´, supra note 37, at 76.
49. See, e.g., Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 60; Limaj, Case No. IT-03-
66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 95–109; Prosecutor v. Lukic´, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 884
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009).
50. Thus, the ICTY has regularly referred to “some degree of organization” when
broadly characterizing this pillar of its armed conflict analysis. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T,
Judgment, ¶ 89 (referring to a 1999 ICRC Working Paper submitted to the Preparatory Com-
mission for the establishment of the elements of crimes for the International Criminal Court,
which stated that armed conflict involves hostilities between armed forces that are organized
to a greater or lesser extent). This phrasing coincides with the ICRC’s characterization of “a
minimum amount of organisation” as a feature of non-international armed conflicts. How Is
the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law? 5 INT’L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS Opinion Paper (2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/ eng/assets/files/other/
opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. (2008).
51. See Prosecutor v. Bos˘koski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 199–203 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008); see also Vite´, supra note 37, at 77.
52. See Vite´, supra note 37, at 77 (listing criteria that are also subsumed within the
Bos˘koski factors).
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Although formalistic and formulaic application of intensity and organ-
ization can pose significant problems for effective conflict recognition,53
the Tadic´ framework offers a useful analytical starting point for identifying
the existence of a non-international armed conflict. The discussion in Part
II below thus applies the Tadic´ framework as one possible tool in analyz-
ing the nature and existence of the U.S. armed conflict with al-Qaeda,
before questioning whether it can provide the answer to the central ques-
tion of this Article: when did the conflict with al-Qaeda start?
C. Understanding the Purposes of the Different Armed Conflict Triggers
The Geneva Conventions, international jurisprudence, and interna-
tional practice all consistently reaffirm that the identification of interna-
tional armed conflict and non-international armed conflict rests on
different thresholds or triggers. In essence,
[w]hen the armed forces of two States are involved, suffice it for
one shot to be fired or one person captured (in conformity with
government instructions) for [LOAC] to apply, while in other
cases (e.g. a summary execution by a secret agent sent by his gov-
ernment abroad), a higher level of violence is necessary.54
Although the distinctions between the law applicable in international
armed conflicts and that applicable in non-international armed conflicts
have abated over time, several key differences remain, most notably the
status of persons caught up in hostilities and the rules governing detention
of both fighters and civilians.55 As a result, the different paradigms for
identification of conflict remain highly relevant for determining the appli-
cable law during times of conflict. Equally important, however, is the rec-
ognition that the differing triggers for international and non-international
armed conflict also mean that LOAC will be triggered at different stages
of the violence, often depending on whether a situation would be an inter-
national armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict. As the
ICTY has held, in international armed conflicts,
the existence of armed force between States is sufficient of itself
to trigger the application of international humanitarian law. In
[non-international armed conflicts], in order to distinguish from
53. See Blank & Corn, supra note 15 (arguing that the strict and formulaic application
of the so-called “elements test” undermines the original objectives of Common Article 3).
54. MARCO SASSO`LI ET AL., HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? CASES, DOCUMENTS
AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA-
RIAN LAW, Ch. 2, 22 (3d ed., 2011).
55. In international armed conflicts, combatants (as defined in the Third Geneva Con-
vention, art. 4, and Additional Protocol I, art. 43) are entitled to prisoner of war status and
combatant immunity. In contrast, there is no combatant status in non-international armed
conflict. Furthermore, the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions establish a comprehensive
framework for detention of prisoners of war and protected persons in international armed
conflict; in non-international armed conflict, there are very few treaty provisions governing
detention.
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cases of civil unrest of terrorist activities, the emphasis is on the
protracted extent of the armed violence and the extent of organi-
zation of the parties involved.56
To address that distinction, it is useful to explore the reasons behind
the different triggering thresholds for the two types of conflict.
The threshold for the existence of an international armed conflict is
deliberately set quite low in order to maximize LOAC’s protective pur-
poses. The Commentary therefore explains that “it makes no difference
how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place or how numer-
ous are the participating forces; it suffices for the armed forces of one
Power to have captured adversaries falling within the scope of Article 4 [of
the Third Geneva Convention].”57 ICTY jurisprudence has followed this
same low threshold approach for international armed conflict, as can be
seen in the definition of armed conflict set forth in Tadic´ and subsequent
cases.58
Although some commentators posit that the definition of interna-
tional armed conflict requires some level of intensity to trigger LOAC and
distinguish mere “border incidents” or “skirmishes” from armed conflict,59
nothing in the Geneva Conventions, the Commentary, or the jurispru-
dence of the international criminal tribunals supports such an analysis. In-
deed, the effect of introducing an intensity threshold for international
armed conflict, absent any such requirement in the law, is to exclude situa-
tions where LOAC’s protective purposes are in demand, thus effectively
narrowing LOAC’s application and undermining the fulfillment of its
goals. If two states detain members of each other’s armed forces, although
no shots are fired, for example, it is an international armed conflict and
LOAC applies, according to Common Article 2 and the ICRC Commen-
tary. This low threshold stems directly from and fulfills LOAC’s core pro-
tective purposes: the soldiers are in the hands of an adverse party and the
56. Prosecutor v. Muciæ, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 184 (Int’l Trib. for the Former Yugo-
slavia, Nov. 16, 1998).
57. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 23. See also Hans-Peter Gasser, Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: an Introduction, in HUMANITY FOR ALL: THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT, at 24 (“[A]s soon as the
armed forces of one State find themselves with wounded or surrendering members of the
armed forces of another State on their hands, as soon as they detain prisoners or have actual
control over a part of the territory of the enemy State, then they must comply with the
relevant convention.”).
58. In Tadic´, the Appeals Chamber stated that armed conflict “exists whenever there
is a resort to armed force between States,” as detailed above. See supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text; see also Prosecutor v. Delaliæ, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 208 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (“In its adjudication of the nature of the armed conflict
with which it is concerned, the Trial Chamber is guided by the Commentary to the Fourth
Geneva Convention, which considers that ‘[a]ny difference arising between two States and
leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces’ is an international armed conflict
and ‘[i]t makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes
place.’”).
59. See, e.g., ILA REPORT, supra note 40, at 3.
Spring 2015] Identifying the Start of Conflict 483
law mandates humane treatment and other protections. Indeed, LOAC
“will apply immediately, since no other legal system can provide adequate
protection given the clash of two domestic systems.”60 The low threshold
for international armed conflict thus fulfills the law’s mandate for such
protections regardless of any level of intensity, and ensures humane treat-
ment when individuals are in the hands of another state. If some level of
intensity were required, then “effectively . . . no law governs the conduct
of military operations below that level of intensity, including the opening
phase of hostilities.”61 Such a result would run directly counter to LOAC.
The parameters for conflict identification and classification thus stem di-
rectly from LOAC’s purposes and operate to fulfill those goals.
In contrast to international armed conflict’s so-called one-shot trigger,
non-international armed conflict has a higher threshold that requires some
level of intensity of violence beyond riots and internal disturbances. Un-
derstanding the purposes and reasoning behind this higher threshold helps
provide a framework for the analysis of the 9/11 attacks below and how to
identify the start of the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda.
At the time of the negotiations and drafting of the Geneva Conventions,
the states were unable to reach a firm consensus on either an actual defini-
tion of non-international armed conflict or even whether such a definition
was desirable. Therefore, states left the concept and framework deliber-
ately vague so as to focus attention and emphasis on the humanitarian
provisions and protections of Common Article 3.62 However, notwith-
standing the lack of specific criteria or further detailed guidance, the delib-
erations demonstrate that, in discussing non-international armed conflict
and what it means, states were envisioning conflicts that looked like the
inter-state conflicts that international law had historically governed.
The three primary—and indeed only—considerations discussed in the
negotiating conference reinforce this conception of non-international
armed conflict. First, the states involved in the debate over Common Arti-
cle 3’s terms and framework devoted significant attention to the need “to
distinguish between [full-scale war] and local uprisings.”63 Thus, as the
60. Andreas Paulus, Non-International Armed Conflict Under Common Article 3, in
Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium, Armed Conflicts and Parties to Armed Conflicts
under IHL: Confronting Legal Categories to Contemporary Realities 30, 30 (2009).
61. Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32, 41 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst
ed., 2012).
62. See, e.g., SANDUSH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 161 (2012) (“Indeed, the drafting history suggests that this [lack of explicit defini-
tion or criteria] was deliberate and the scope of application of common Article 3 left open on
purpose, as every attempt to elaborate or to provide guidance led to disagreement and lack
of consensus.”); FINAL RECORD 79 (quoting General Slavin of the U.S.S.R.) (1949) [hereinaf-
ter FINAL RECORD 1949] (“It was of paramount importance that upon the outbreak of a
conflict, the application of the Conventions should be automatic” in order to ensure humani-
tarian protections.).
63. FINAL RECORD 1949, supra note 62 at 15 (quoting Mr. W.R. Hodgson of Austl.)
(1949).
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Special Committee tasked with formulating the text of what would be-
come Common Article 3 reported in July 1949, the notion of armed con-
flicts not of an international character “presupposed an armed conflict
resembling an international war in dimensions, and did not include a mere
strife between the forces of the State and one or several groups of persons
(uprisings, etc.).”64 These understandings are then reflected in the Com-
mentary’s explanation that riots, banditry and internal disturbances do not
rise to the level of non-international armed conflict.65
Second, states sought to preserve their ability to pursue and punish
criminals and traitors in the course of repressing riots and uprisings against
state authority. As the United States delegation emphasized, “[e]very gov-
ernment had a right to suppress rebellion within its borders and to punish
the insurgents in accordance with its penal laws.”66 The Special Commit-
tee’s report thus explained that a common theme in all of the proposals for
legal regulation of non-international armed conflict was that “it would be
dangerous to weaken the State when confronted by movements caused by
disorder, anarchy and banditry, by compelling it to apply to them, in addi-
tion to its peacetime legislation, Conventions which were intended for use
in a state of declared war or undeclared war.”67 The deliberations—as well
as the resulting differentiated threshold for non-international armed con-
flict—manifested the unwillingness of states “to cede their sovereign pre-
rogative to deal with internal dissident challenges . . . by committing to
extensive international legal regulation . . . .”68 Here one distinction un-
derlying the triggers for international and non-international armed conflict
is evident: states do not have domestic legal frameworks for addressing
threats and attacks from other states; that is the very raison d’eˆtre of inter-
national law. In contrast, one of the central functions of the state internally
is to maintain public order and security. For many states, therefore, the
notion of a one-shot or very low threshold for non-international armed
conflict was and remains simply anathema to the inherent sovereign au-
thority of the state.
Third, as expressed in both the state deliberations at the Diplomatic
Conference and in the Commentary, the reluctance to grant any belliger-
ency or legitimacy to internal uprisings, insurgencies or other groups was a
driving force in the debates over the threshold for non-international
64. Id. at 121. In this light, Australia argued that the “Conventions should apply when
civil war was of such magnitude as to be a full-scale war,” Id. at 42, and the Joint Committee
noted that “it was clear that [armed conflict not of an international character] referred to civil
war, and not to a mere riot or disturbances caused by bandits.” Id. at 129. Similarly, the Swiss
delegation declared that “outbreaks of individual banditism, or even movements of the kind,
complicated or aggravated by the existence of a conspiracy, do not really constitute an armed
conflict in the proper sense of the term. Nor does a mere riot constitute an armed conflict.”
Id. at 335.
65. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 36.
66. FINAL RECORD 1949, supra note 62, at 42 (quoting Mr. Yingling of the U.S.).
67. Id. at 121.
68. GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL
APPROACH 77 (2012).
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armed conflict.69 The overwhelming majority of the critiques of proposed
Common Article 3 (which was originally paragraph 4 of Article 2 until the
final version) addressed this question of status and legitimacy. As the rep-
resentative of the United Kingdom explained, the new provision “was a
source of serious difficulties, not only because the Conventions would be
applicable to situations which were not war, but because the application of
the Conventions would appear to give the status of belligerents to insur-
gents, whose right to wage war could not be recognized.”70 For this reason,
many of the early proposals for a provision regulating non-international
armed conflicts focused on specific criteria as a pre-condition of applica-
tion, seeking to restrict the types of situations to which the provisions and
principles of the Geneva Conventions would apply.71 In the end, because
these concerns about legitimacy and status presented a serious obstacle to
any provision regulating non-international armed conflict, Common Arti-
cle 3 includes an essential final provision, reaffirming that “[t]he applica-
tion of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the
Parties to the conflict.”72 These same concerns about legitimacy and status
persist today, as the debates over the categorization of conflicts with ter-
rorist groups demonstrate. For example, President Uribe of Colombia re-
sisted characterizing the armed violence between the government and the
FARC as an armed conflict because such a designation “would place both
the rebels and the Armed Forces on equal footing.”73
Together, the considerations that lay at the heart of the deliberations
on Common Article 3 in 1949 demonstrate that the threshold for non-
international armed conflict does not mirror the “one-shot” low threshold
for international armed conflict. If the states had intended for non-interna-
tional armed conflict to be triggered upon one act, that intention would
likely be reflected in the discussions and debates in the travaux
pre´paratoires and the Commentary. Instead, nowhere in either the Com-
mentaries to the Geneva Conventions or the travaux pre´paratoires for
69. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 22 at 32, 43.
70. FINAL RECORD 1949, supra note 62, at 10.
71. See The Australian, French and United States proposals at the Diplomatic Confer-
ence, for example, included components aimed in this direction. The Australian proposal
included the following criteria: “(1) the de jure government had recognized the insurgents as
belligerents, or; (2) the de jure government had claimed for itself the right of belligerent, and;
(3) the de jure government had accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the
purposes only of the present Conventions.” FINAL RECORD 1949, supra note 62 at 15; see also
David A. Elder, The Historical Background of Common Article 3 of The Geneva Convention
of 1949, 11 CASE WEST. R. J. INT’L. L. 37, 44–45 (1979).
72. Common Article 3, supra note 8. See GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 22 at 43
(noting that without the final provisions, “Article 3 would probably never have been
adopted”).
73. Guillermo Ota´lora Lozano & Sebastia´n Machado, The Objective Qualification of
Non-International Armed Conflicts: A Colombian Case Study, 4 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM 58,
60 (2012). “Uribe was concerned that the recognition of an armed conflict, and thus the
implicit recognition of the FARC as an armed group party to an armed conflict, would result
in the application of international humanitarian law, which he suspected would grant some
special protection to the rebels.” Id. at 60–61.
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Common Article 3 is there any discussion whether, or suggestion that, a
single attack or event could constitute or trigger a non-international armed
conflict. The entirety of the debates and discussions evinces the opposite
preoccupation, instead seeking to foreclose international legal regulation
for internal violence until that situation reached a level beyond the state’s
ordinary law and order capabilities.
To be sure, the ultimate decision to avoid any definition of or even
criteria for the identification of non-international armed conflict mani-
fested the desire of states to focus on the humanitarian imperatives of reg-
ulating non-international armed conflict rather than the structural and
procedural components of such a conflict.74 In so doing, the text of Com-
mon Article 3 and the subsequent explanatory discussion in the Commen-
tary highlight that the identification of non-international armed conflict
involves a recognition of two important considerations: (1) the imperative
need to mitigate the brutality of internal conflicts, regardless of who is
involved or the perceived justness of any one side’s cause; and (2) the vital
concern of states with upholding their sovereign prerogative to address
and suppress internal unrest. Too restrictive a threshold undermines the
first consideration—as seen in the debates over the characterization of the
situation in Syria75—while too permissive a threshold risks overstating the
second—as seen in the debates over the character of the United States
conflict with al-Qaeda.76
Even in the absence of a particular definition and in light of the com-
plexities that lie at the heart of Common Article 3’s formulation, the his-
torical backdrop to and practical considerations inherent in Common
Article 3 demonstrate that the trigger for non-international armed conflict
was never intended, nor understood, to be analogous to the trigger for
international armed conflict. The nature of the two thresholds, and the
very purposes of these thresholds, reinforces this distinction:
Violence between States is an exceptional situation, which implies
that as soon as there is violence between the armed forces of
States - even if only isolated incidents of violence - that the thresh-
old of international armed conflict is reached. In non-interna-
74. Elder, supra note 71, at 53 (“There emerged during the long and often heated
discussions of the various drafts, a consensus that, at a minimum, fundamental humanitarian
norms would be binding in armed conflict not of an international character which surpassed
in severity and organization mere rioting or terrorism but which are not in all respects analo-
gous to an international war within the confines of a single state.”).
75. See Blank & Corn, supra note 15 (arguing that the artificially high threshold
caused by an overly formalized test for the recognition of non-international armed conflict
undermines the original objective of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions: to miti-
gate the brutality inherent in internal conflicts and to ensure a pragmatic totality of the cir-
cumstances approach to the imposition of international legal regulation for non-international
armed conflict).
76. See generally Kenneth Roth, Comment, The Law of War in the War on Terror, 83
FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2004) (describing the divergent authorities that result from an inconsistent
application of LOAC and law enforcement paradigms to al-Qaeda suspects in the United
States and abroad).
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tional armed conflict however, the threshold of violence is much
higher since violence within a State happens all the time. Only if
violence reaches a high level of intensity, out of the control of the
normal law enforcement paradigm, does the situation escalate to
become a non-international armed conflict. Determining the right
threshold is often difficult and . . . one should not allow States to
apply the laws of armed conflict too easily to situations of internal
violence.77
The following Part applies this foundational analysis and these central
purposes for the international armed conflict and non-international armed
conflict triggers to the start of the United States conflict with al-Qaeda.
II. APPLYING THE PARADIGM TO THE U.S. CONFLICT WITH AL-QAEDA
The conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda has spawned an
extensive literature—articles, policy papers, case law—and generated in-
numerable conferences on the question of whether a state can be in a con-
flict with a transnational terrorist group and, if so, what the parameters of
such a conflict could be. These debates have centered primarily on
whether such a conflict exists,78 where it is taking place,79 and what law
applies to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of persons in such a
conflict.80 The temporal parameters of the conflict have garnered less at-
tention, although they figure prominently in several cases before the mili-
tary commissions—regarding the beginning of the conflict81—and in
policy statements and legislative hearings—with respect to a potential end
to the conflict.82 Furthermore, within the context of the beginning of the
conflict, the primary question has been whether al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-
77. Discussion–Session 1: Categories of Armed Conflict: Notions and Interpretations, in
Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium, Armed Conflicts and Parties to Armed Conflicts
under IHL: Confronting Legal Categories to Contemporary Realities 44, 44 (2009).
78. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 12; Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28
YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2003).
79. See, e.g., Jake William Rylatt, An Evaluation of the U.S. Policy of “Targeted Kill-
ing” under International Law, 44 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 39 (2013); Laurie R. Blank, Defining the
Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of
the Zone of Combat, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 1 (2010); Jinks, supra note 78.
80. See, e.g., Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets
the Eye, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 189 (2011); Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The
Military Commissions Act of 2006 and U.S. Counterterror Operations, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 56
(2007); Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in
Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Joseph P. Bialke, Al-Qaeda &
Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of
Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1 (2004).
81. See, e.g., Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, United States v. Al-Nashiri M.C. (2012).
82. See, e.g., Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., The Conflict
Against Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End? (Nov. 30, 2012); Authorization for Use
of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Mary E. McLeod, Principal Deputy Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t. of State); Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Af-
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linked attacks before September 11, 2001 are part of the conflict. The
question of the legal effect of the 9/11 attacks themselves and whether the
conflict between the U.S. and al Qaeda started with the attacks has simply
been lost in the shuffle.
The rhetorical “war on terror” surely began on 9/11. But the question
of whether a non-international armed conflict between the United States
and al-Qaeda began on that day—whether it even could, under LOAC’s
parameters, begin on that day—is wholly different. For purposes of legal
analysis, clarity, accountability and various other considerations, however,
it is an essential question. This Part first analyzes how the United States’
efforts to combat al-Qaeda have generally been viewed and the justifica-
tions for those views. Next, this Part examines three possible paradigms
for conflict recognition in this type of conflict: (1) the Tadic´ framework;
(2) the idea of the non-state group’s attack starting the conflict; and (3) the
idea that a state can unilaterally declare war against a non-state group.
Each of these approaches results in different conclusions regarding the
starting point of the conflict and, more importantly, raises significant is-
sues regarding how conflict recognition paradigms accord with LOAC’s
core purposes and framework. Finally, this Part goes beyond the doctrinal
legal analysis and explores the operational considerations that go hand-in-
hand with, and must be seen as an essential component of, this analysis.
A. The Dominant Perspectives on the Existence and Timeframe
for the Conflict
There are three primary views regarding the existence and onset of
the United States’ conflict with al-Qaeda: (1) there is no armed conflict
between the United States and al-Qaeda; (2) an armed conflict between
the United States and al-Qaeda began before September 11, 2001; or (3)
an armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda began after the
September 11, 2001 attacks. The third view is the predominant one and
also the most supportable under LOAC’s traditional framework. As the
discussion below demonstrates, however, this generally accepted analysis
does not extend to a more discriminating examination of precisely when
the conflict started and why.
1. There Is No Armed Conflict Between Al Qaeda and
the United States
Notwithstanding the now strong consensus that the United States and
al-Qaeda are in an armed conflict, a number of commentators continue to
deny the existence and possibility of such a conflict. Accordingly, although
the United States is in an armed conflict in Afghanistan as a result of U.S.
intervention and the internationalization of the non-international armed
conflict there on October 7, 2001,83 they argue that the United States can-
ghanistan: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. 2 (2014)
(statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Sterling Professor of Int’l Law, Yale Law Sch.)
83. Paust, supra note 12, at 764.
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not be engaged in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda apart
from that conflict. Some proponents of this argument believe that al-
Qaeda lacks competency to be engaged in an armed conflict.84 Essentially,
they label al-Qaeda a criminal organization and its hostile acts directed at
the United States as criminal acts. “In the language of international law
there is no basis for speaking of a war on Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist
group, for such a group cannot be a belligerent, it is merely a band of
criminals . . . .”85 The criminal nature of al-Qaeda, the organization, as
well its hostile acts—and its failure to qualify as an insurgency86—render
al-Qaeda incapable of engaging in an armed conflict with the United
States.87 As a result, regardless of the scale or effect of the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, this argument posits that those attacks were mere acts of
terrorism to which “‘war’ or ‘armed conflict’ and the laws of war could not
have applied . . . even though the attacks undoubtedly triggered other in-
ternational laws.”88
A second school of dissenters argues that al-Qaeda’s attacks and any
U.S. responses simply do not rise above the threshold for a non-interna-
tional armed conflict:
the acts of terrorism and the responses thereto that have been tak-
ing place since 11 September 2001 cannot be qualified as a global
non-international armed conflict within the meaning of common
article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. At present, there is insuffi-
cient factual evidence that would allow the violence that is taking
place to be imputed to a specific non-state “party” to the conflict.
It is also evident that most of the activities being undertaken to
prevent or suppress terrorist acts do not amount to an armed
conflict.89
If, indeed, there can be no armed conflict between the United States
and al-Qaeda, then the significance of 9/11 for conflict recognition is no
longer relevant. The absence of an armed conflict means LOAC is inappli-
cable. It also means that al-Qaeda operatives cannot be tried before mili-
84. Id. at 767–68.
85. Christopher Greenwood, War, Terrorism, and International Law, 56 CURRENT LE-
GAL PROBS. 505, 529 (2004).
86. See Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War,
28 YALE J. INT’L L. 325, 326 (2003); Amnesty Int’l, Yemen: The Rule of Law Sidelined in the
Name of Security (2003), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE31/006/2003/en/
084dc66b-d6a7-11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/mde310062003en.html. Cf. John C. Yoo & James C.
Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 207, 208 (2003).
87. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors through a
Global War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 445–46 (2005); see also Paust,
supra note 86, at 326.
88. Paust, supra note 86, at 327.
89. Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role for International Law?, 75 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 71, 87 (2004).
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tary commissions except as part of the United States conflict in
Afghanistan.90
2. The Armed Conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda Began
Before September 11, 2001
Although the proponents of the “no armed conflict” viewpoint con-
tinue to press their arguments, they have lost out to the consensus that the
United States can be, and is, engaged in an armed conflict with al-
Qaeda.91 However, when one digs below the surface, little consensus ap-
pears regarding the actual timeframe of the conflict.
For accountability purposes at the military commissions, the U.S. gov-
ernment argues that the armed conflict with al-Qaeda predates the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks. According to this view, al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-
linked attacks on U.S. diplomatic and military facilities throughout the
1990s triggered the armed conflict. Between 1992 and 2000, al-Qaeda or
entities believed to be associated in some fashion with al-Qaeda launched
a number of attacks, including the bombing of two hotels frequented by
U.S. troops in Aden, Yemen in 1992; the first World Trade Center bomb-
ing (and, some argue, the infamous Blackhawk Down episode in Mogad-
ishu, Somalia) in 1993; the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and
Tanzania; and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole.92
90. Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 1, 5–8 (2002) (“The President’s Commander-in-Chief power to set up military
commissions applies only during actual war within a war zone or relevant occupied territory
and apparently ends when peace is finalized. The United States was clearly at war . . . in
Afghanistan after the insurgency between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance was up-
graded to an international armed conflict when the United States used military force in Af-
ghanistan on October 7. . . . While ‘war’ remains in Afghanistan, the United States can set up
a military commission in Afghanistan . . . to try those reasonably accused of war crimes . . .”).
Although Paust’s argument is tailored to the military commissions established by presidential
military order in November 2001 and not those established with congressional endorsement
under the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009), his
main point, that the United States cannot establish military commissions with jurisdiction
exceeding the bounds established for such tribunals by international law, continues to apply.
Jordan J. Paust, Still Unlawful: The Obama Military Commissions, Supreme Court Holdings,
and Deviant Dicta in the D.C. Circuit, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 367, 374–75 n. 29 (2013).
91. See Marco Sasso`li, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian
Law, OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES OF THE PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL’Y AND CON-
FLICT RES. AT HARV. U., no. 6, Winter 2996, at 8, 42, available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org
/sites/default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper6.pdf (noting that “existing IHL determines
that a sustained ‘war’ between one or several states, on the one side, and a transnational
terrorist group, on the other, may fall under the concept (and law) of a non-international
armed conflict.”). See also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, REPORT ON TER-
RORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ¶12 OEA/Ser. L/V/II.116 Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr. October 22, 2002,
available at www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/toc.htm, para 7; Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control
of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 99-100 (2002);
see also Noe¨lle Que´nivet, The Applicability of IHL to Situations of a (Counter-)Terrorist Na-
ture, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 21ST CENTURY’S CONFLICTS 53–56
(Arnold & Hildbrand, eds., 2005).
92. NAT’L COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 59–70, 152–53 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. Robert Burns, U.S.
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To the Bush administration, although al-Qaeda’s attacks on
America are not entirely continuous, they are also not “isolated”
or “sporadic”; on the contrary, the September 11 attacks were
part of a series of attacks that began with the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center and continue to this day, although no attacks
have been as spectacular or deadly as the September 11 attacks.93
Thus, “Al Qaeda’s campaign throughout the 1990s against American
targets . . . amounted to a war,” if one views these attacks as a “coherent
campaign rather than isolated acts of individuals.”94
By charging several individuals with war crimes for conduct dating
back to 1996, the United States has adopted the position that the armed
conflict with al-Qaeda began before 9/11, and no later than 1996. For ex-
ample, the United States charged Yasser Hamdan, bin Laden’s bodyguard
and driver, with conspiracy95 before a military commission, specifying that:
Hamdan, a person subject to trial by military commission as an
alien unlawful enemy combatant, did, in Afghanistan and other
countries, from in or about February 1996 to on or about Novem-
ber 24, 2001, conspire and agree with Usama bin Laden . . . and
various members and associates . . . of the al Qaeda organiza-
tion . . . and said al Qaeda engaged in hostilities against the
United States.96
Likewise, before transferring the case to an Article III court, the
United States charged Ahmed Khlafan Ghailani with conspiracy before a
military commission, specifying:
Ship Rammed, 4 Sailors Killed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 12, 2000 available at 2000 WLNR
7809230; Karin Davies, Kenya, Tanzania Blasts Kill 107, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 8, 1998
available at http://.apnewsarchive.com//-Blasts-Kill-107/82c2173e67b83f71bddc3faba5915148;
Michael R. Gordon & Thomas L. Friedman, Details of U.S. Raid in Somalia: Success So Near,
a Loss So Deep, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1993, at A5; Tom Hays, Huge Blast Shakes World
Trade Center, Killing 5; Car Bomb Suspected, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 27, 1993; Hotels
Bombed, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 31, 1992, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/hotels-bombed-1566099.html.
93. Brooks, supra note 10, at 718.
94. Ruth Wedgewood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J.
INT’L L. 328, 330 (2002).
95. Conspiracy is not generally accepted as a violation of the law of war. See, e.g.,
Raha Wala, Note, From Guantanamo to Nuremberg and Back: An Analysis of Conspiracy to
Commit War Crimes Under International Humanitarian Law, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 683 (2010);
George P. Fletcher, The Hamdan Case and Conspiracy as a War Crime: A New Beginning for
International Law in the U.S., 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 442 (2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006). However, conspiracy was included as a separate offense, chargeable before
military commissions in both the 2006 and 2009 Military Commissions Acts. Thus, according
to the United States, conspiracy is a distinct violation of LOAC. The D.C. Circuit recently
affirmed the viability of conspiracy as a separate LOAC offense, as a domestic statutory
matter under the 2009 Military Commission Act, in Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
96. Charge Sheet at 3, United States v. Hamdan, M.C. (2008) (AE001).
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Ghailani . . . a person subject to trial by military commission as an
alien unlawful enemy combatant, did, at various locations, from in
or about 1996 to on or about August 7, 1998, conspire and agree
with Usama bin Laden . . . to commit . . . offenses triable by mili-
tary commission.97
The United States also accuses Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri of being the
“mastermind” of the October 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, charging
him with various violations of the law of war related to that bombing, as
well as the attempted bombing of the U.S.S. Sullivans earlier that year.98
The Convening Authority—a senior military officer who is responsi-
ble, ultimately, to the President of the United States—adopted the charges
described above. Thus, by charging these and other individuals associated
with al-Qaeda with LOAC violations before the military commissions for
conduct from 1996 onward, the United States demonstrates that it believes
the armed conflict with al-Qaeda must have begun no later than 1996.99
By statute and by custom, military commissions are tribunals with ju-
risdiction to try individuals for violations of the law of war, and cannot try
non-LOAC violations.100 Both the 2006 and 2009 Military Commissions
Acts granted military commissions jurisdiction “to try persons . . . for any
offense made punishable by . . . the law of war”101 and, although they
granted military commissions jurisdiction to try individuals for conduct on
or before September 11, 2001,102 they were limited to trying only offenses
“committed in the context of and associated with hostilities.”103 Thus, any
charges before a military commission imply that the United States believes
the relevant conduct occurred during an armed conflict.104
Moreover, the United States has explicitly argued that an armed con-
flict between the United States and al-Qaeda existed by 1996. In rejecting
Hamdan’s motion for a bill of particulars, Judge Allred found that:
97. Charge Sheet at 1, United States v. Ghailani, M.C. (2009) (AE018).
98. Charge Sheet, United States v. Al-Nashiri, M.C. (2008) (AE001).
99. See UNITED STATES ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND
SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK (Brian J. Bill ed., 2010); Military Commission Ruling on
Defense Motion to Dismiss Because the Convening Authority Exceeded his Power in Refer-
ring this Case to a Military Commission at 2-3, United States v. al-Nashiri, M.C. (2013) (AE-
104F) (“Congress, with the President’s concurrence, has impliedly made a political judgment
regarding the existence of hostilities through its recognition of military commissions as a
forum for adjudication of violations of the laws of war occurring “before, on, or after Sep-
tember 11, 2001.”).
100. See LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 99, at 17–24 (“The law of war is triggered
by conflict.”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2127–33 (2005); Hamdan (plurality opinion).
101. 10 U.S.C.A. § 948(d) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113–180).
102. See id.
103. 10 U.S.C.A. § 950(p)(c) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113–180).
104. Cf. Government Response to Defense Motion to Dismiss Because the Convening
Authority Exceeded His Power in Referring the Case to a Military Commission at ¶ 6, United
States v. Al-Nashiri M.C. (2012) (AE104).
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[t]he Government has repeatedly declared that its theory at trial
will be that the armed conflict between the United States and al-
Qaeda/ bin Laden began not later than 1996, and that the ac-
cused’s support for and assistance to bin-Laden [sic] after that
date was therefore related to or connected with a period of armed
conflict.105
However, the United States has also held out the possibility that an
armed conflict existed between it and al-Qaeda even before 1996.106 Dur-
ing the Hamdan military commission, the prosecution introduced evidence
of the string of declarations bin Laden issued from 1992 onward,107 as well
as evidence of al-Qaeda-authored attacks or attempted attacks beginning
in 1991.108 The prosecution also asserted that al-Qaeda employed a mili-
tary committee and continuously operated training camps in Afghanistan
from 1992 until 2001, and that from 1996-2001 the training camps in Af-
ghanistan were operated by al-Qaeda exclusively, without the Taliban gov-
ernment’s involvement.109 The prosecution also highlighted al-Qaeda’s
1996 declaration of war against the United States and asserted that it is a
factor to consider in assessing the existence of a non-international armed
conflict.110 Finally, the prosecution introduced evidence designed to show
105. Military Commission Ruling on Motion for Bill of Particulars at 1, United States v.
Hamdan M.C. (2008) (AE 214). See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 582, United States v.
Hamdan M.C. (2008) (In response to a question from Judge Allred concerning when the
armed conflict with al-Qaeda began, the Government responded, “It’s the government’s po-
sition that this period of armed conflicts included all events in the dates alleged so that would
be part of the Court’s determination, but the government’s position is that this case goes
forward because the period of armed conflict includes all the offenses and dates alleged, in
other words, from February 1996 through November 24, 2001.”).
106. Id. at 586 (“In February of 1996, that was essentially the date when Mr. Hamdan
entered Afghanistan, and therefore that would be the date that we contend that he joined the
ongoing hostilities which were taking place. So that’s the significance of us choosing that
particular date.”).
107. Id. at 407.
108. Id. at 408–09, 2853–57. But see testimony of Prosecution witness Evan Kohlmann,
Id. at 3108:20-3109:6 (“A [MR. KOHLMANN]: Well, the first—I would say the first official
attack carried out by al Qaeda would probably be the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.
However, Arab Afghans, in other words, Arab mujahideen, who confessed to training at
camps in Afghanistan run by Usama bin Laden, had carried out attacks as early as February
of 1993 in New York, the World Trade Center bombing. Also in November of 1995 there was
a bombing in Riyadh outside of a joint Saudi-U.S. National Guard complex that was again
carried out by Arab mujahideen who had trained at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. There
was a suicide bombing carried out in Croatia in 1995.”)
109. Id. at 2848, 2851.
110. Id. at 2854:15-5855:7. Under cross-examination, Professor Geoffrey Corn testified:
Q [LCDR STONE]: Now, you agree that the declaration of war in 1996 is in and of
itself one factor that you must consider to whether or not an armed conflict be-
tween al-Qaeda and the United States existed; correct?
A [MR. CORN]: No, I think in my direct testimony I—I—I qualified that by indi-
cating I’m not sure what the effect of an assertion of an existence of a state of war
between the non-state entity and the state actually is. The discussion of declaration
494 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:467
that al-Qaeda viewed the 1998 embassy bombings, the 2000 Cole bombing,
and the 9/11 attacks to be hostile acts in the course of an ongoing armed
conflict.111
3. Armed Conflict with al-Qaeda After the
September 11, 2001 Attacks
The most common perspective on the conflict between the United
States and al-Qaeda recognizes an armed conflict that began following the
9/11 attacks. Although most discussion in this vein simply takes a mono-
lithic approach without parsing the actual starting point, the predominant
view—or certainly the predominant assumption—is that the conflict
started on 9/11 or immediately thereafter when President Bush declared
that the United States was “at war” with al-Qaeda.112 Others, however,
assert that the conflict began when United States forces launched military
operations in Afghanistan in late September or early October 2001.
Those who see the 9/11 attacks as the start of the conflict focus on the
attacks’ scale, the targets, the reaction of the United States, and sometimes
al-Qaeda’s previous attacks and putative declarations of war against the
United States.113 For the United States, the attacks were “an implicit dec-
laration of war by al-Qaeda and simultaneously an act of war . . . by al-
Qaeda acting independently as a transnational terrorist group and not on
behalf of any state.”114 Those who purport to preserve the non-interna-
tional armed conflict recognition paradigm and still have 9/11 as the start-
ing point try to fit the attacks into the intensity framework. “The main
of war in the commentary refers to—is a commentary to Common Article 2. But
I’ll concede that it—it would be something to look at.
Q [LCDR STONE]: And did you not testify on direct that the declaration of war
was a factor but not dispositive in this armed conflict?
A [MR. CORN]: As I just said, I’ll concede that it’s something to look at. Id.
111. Id. at 3007, 3010, 3018–19, 3101–02, 3109.
112. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVI-
TIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 1 (2006); Jennifer
C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting
Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1176 (2013); Jinks, supra note 78,
at 33–4; Stephan Hadley, Remarks at the Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University
(Sept. 24, 2004).
113. Yoo & Ho, supra note 86CITEOLD ID=“_Ref401860689”>, at 209–13 (“whatever
the ‘level of intensity’ required to create an armed conflict, the gravity and scale of the vio-
lence unleashed on the United States on September 11 crossed that threshold.”).
114. Avril McDonald, Declarations of War and Belligerent Parties: International Law
Governing Hostilities Between States and Transnational Terrorist Networks, 54 NTIR. 279,
285 (2007). President Bush called the attacks “an act of war,” President George W. Bush,
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terror-
ist Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), in SELECTED SPEECHES OF PRESIDENT GEORGE
W. BUSH, 2001–2008, 66, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/
documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). Others ar-
gue that the attacks’ “coordinated applications of force resulting in enormous property de-
struction and an astonishing loss of life” initiated the conflict. Jinks, supra note 78, at 33.
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argument of these scholars is that a situation can be of such intensity that
it changes the law enforcement paradigm to the application of the laws of
war.”115 In essence, the attacks went far beyond riots and isolated acts of
violence that lie below the armed conflict threshold. Rather, these propo-
nents argue, “[al-Qaeda] carried on a sustained campaign against the
United States, culminating in September 11 with a devastating series of
coordinated attacks resulting in a massive death toll.”116
The extension of this theory focuses on President Bush’s rhetoric in
the days immediately following September 11, effectively pronouncing the
existence of a conflict at that moment. For example, on September 20,
President Bush declared that “[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda,
but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of
global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”117 Several days later,
President Bush reaffirmed that the United States was at war, revisiting the
“war on terror” theme once more.118
For those who focus on U.S. military action and the exchange of hos-
tilities, the conflict began on October 7, 2001, when the United States be-
gan bombing Afghanistan.119 Some therefore tie the conflict with al-
Qaeda directly—and only—to the conflict in Afghanistan but still recog-
nize a conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda. This view sees no
armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda outside of Af-
ghanistan because armed conflicts are necessarily tied to geography120 and
do not extend to any location in the world where a member of al-Qaeda
may be present.121 Thus, as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions stated:
Al-Qaeda and entities with various degrees of “association” with
it are indeed known to have operated in numerous countries
115. Paulus, supra note 60, at 30–31.
116. Yoo & Ho, supra note 86, at 213.
117. Bush, supra note 114, at 68.
118. See Roth, supra note 76, at 2 (quoting President Bush’s statement made on Sep-
tember 29, 2001: “Our [W]ar on [T]error will be much broader than the battlefields and
beachheads of the past. The war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.”).
119. See, e.g., John Bellinger, Armed Conflict with Al Qaida? OPINIOJURIS.ORG (Jan. 15,
2007), http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/15/armed-conflict-with-al-qaida/.
120. Cf. U.N. Human Rights Council, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, ¶¶ 53–56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6;
Human Rights Council 14th Sess., (May 28, 2010) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report];
Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Is a War not a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror, 12
ILSA J. INT’L COMP. L. 535, 538 (2005) (“Some try to argue that a war began on September
11 because the attacks were an ‘act of war,’ or those attacks plus others by Al Qaeda during
the previous ten years. Wars, however, do not begin with an attack. They begin with a
counter-attack. States may have the right to engage in a war of self-defense following an
attack. If they chose not to do so, there is no war. War, as discussed above requires exchange,
intensity and duration.”). But see Brooks, supra note 10, at 724, 744 (characterizing strict
application of territorial bounds to an armed conflict as “formalistic” and the United States’
expansive approach as “plausible”).
121. See Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 120 at ¶ 52.
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around the world including in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan,
Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain, among others, where
they have conducted terrorist attacks. Yet none of these States,
with the possible exception of Pakistan, recognize themselves as
being part of an armed conflict against al-Qaeda or its “associ-
ates” in their territory.122
In general, however, the debate in this arena focuses on whether the
United States-al-Qaeda conflict is a global conflict—i.e., unlimited geo-
graphically—or a series of conflicts between the United States and al-
Qaeda or al-Qaeda-associated groups in different locations. The United
States characterizes the conflict as a “global non-international armed con-
flict,” taking an expansive view of the application of LOAC.123 According
to the United States, it has the legal authority to kill or detain anyone who
is “part of” or “substantially supported” al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associ-
ated forces, anywhere in the world, subject to limiting policy and jus ad
bellum considerations.124 Another somewhat comparable formulation is
the idea of “transnational armed conflict,”125 which is a conflict between a
state and a non-state group outside its territory, one that does not fit
neatly into the Common Article 2-Common Article 3 paradigm. Finally,
many—namely the ICRC—favor a case-by-case approach, assessing the
violence between two parties in each country or geographic location to
determine whether the intensity and organization, or the totality of the
circumstances, meets the threshold for an armed conflict.126 As a result,
the United States and al-Qaeda may be engaged in numerous locations
around the world, such as Yemen, Pakistan, perhaps Somalia, but are not
in one single all-encompassing conflict.
B. Methodologies: How to Identify the Start of the Armed Conflict
between the United States and al-Qaeda
Applying LOAC’s traditional framework to the situation between the
United States and al-Qaeda leads to the conclusion that after a number of
isolated terrorist attacks, to which the United States responded predomi-
122. Id. at ¶ 54.
123. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QAEDA OR AN
ASSOCIATED FORCE (White Paper 2011), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/
sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf [hereinafter DOJ White Paper on Targeted
Killing]; David E. Graham, Defining Non-International Armed Conflict: A Historically Diffi-
cult Task, 88 INT’L L.STUD. 43, 50–2 (2011).
124. DOJ White Paper on Targeted Killing, supra note 123; Daskal, supra note 112, at
1176.
125. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Hostilities:
The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
295, 296 (2007); Corn & Jensen, supra note 10.
126. See 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Nov. 28-Dec.
1, 2011, Geneva, Switz. International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contempo-
rary Armed Conflicts, 31IC/11/5.1.2, at 9–11 (Oct. 2011).
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nantly with law enforcement measures, the United States eventually re-
sorted to military force and extensive military operations after the most
egregious and consequential attack, in an attempt to defeat al-Qaeda and
end its threat to the United States. Yet, popular discourse, U.S. policy
rhetoric, and a substantial number of international commentators view the
conflict as starting earlier than this point—either on or before September
11, 2001. This divergence raises important questions about the application
of LOAC’s framework to a conflict with a transnational terrorist group
and, equally important, whether this type of conflict demands or justifies a
different approach to conflict recognition. For example, if one concludes
that the conflict could not have started until after the United States re-
sponded and hostilities began in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, consider
the consequences for the operational authority for United States action on
and immediately after 9/11: was the United States therefore restricted only
to law enforcement measures? Alternatively, if one views the 9/11 attacks
as sufficient to start the conflict, consider what that would have meant if
the United States had not responded with military action at all: was there a
conflict based only on the action of a non-state group? This Section and
the following Section explore several possible methodologies for conflict
recognition in this scenario, and how effective or potentially problematic
such methodologies could be, and then introduce operational considera-
tions as well to obtain a more complete picture of the conflict recognition
process and its ramifications.
1. Applying the Commentary and Tadic´ to the Armed Conflict
between the United States and al-Qaeda
The classic LOAC framework relies on a threshold that differentiates
non-international armed conflict from other situations of violence, such as
“riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature.”127 Whether one relies on a strict application of the Tadic´  ele-
ments or prefers a more totality of the circumstances approach, this con-
flict recognition framework rests on some level of intensity of violence and
some measure of organization of the parties. The nature of the state’s re-
sponse is also an important factor, whether packaged within the intensity
analysis or considered separately. As noted in Part I above, courts and
other bodies throughout the international system regularly apply this
framework.128 Indeed, interestingly, the military commissions also appear
to use this methodology (although the military commissions have gener-
127. AP II, supra note 17, art. 1(2).
128. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 620 (Sept. 2, 1998)
(“For a finding to be made on the existence of an internal armed conflict in the territory of
Rwanda at the time of the events alleged, it will therefore be necessary to evaluate both the
intensity and organization of the parties to the armed conflict.”); U.N. GAOR, Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. A/68/382,
GAOR 68th Sess., (Sept. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings];
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 95 (Feb. 25, 2009).
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ally reached a different conclusion), as jury instructions demonstrate. For
example, in Hamdan, the judge instructed the members:
With respect to each of the ten specifications before you, the gov-
ernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the actions
of the accused took place in the context of and that they were
associated with armed conflict. In determining whether an armed
conflict existed between the United States and al Qaeda and when it
began, you should consider the length, duration, and intensity of
hostilities between the parties, whether there was protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups, whether and when the United States decided to employ the
combat capabilities of its armed forces to meet the al Qaeda threat,
the number of persons killed or wounded on each side, the amount
of property damage on each side, statements of the leaders of both
sides indicating their perceptions regarding the existence of an
armed conflict, including the presence or absence of a declaration
to that effect, and any other facts or circumstances you consider
relevant to determining the existence of armed conflict.129
These instructions concerning the existence of an armed conflict—and
similar instructions provided in Bahlul130—closely track the indicia of
armed conflict identified by the ICTY and other international bodies.
Using this framework, the armed conflict between the United States
and al-Qaeda did not begin before October 7, 2001, when the United
States launched its bombing campaign to oust the Taliban from Afghani-
stan, or perhaps a week or two earlier, when United States Special Forces
began fighting alongside the Northern Alliance.
a. Intensity
Hostilities between the United States and al-Qaeda did not rise to the
level of intensity requisite for a non-international armed conflict before
the United States launched extensive military operations against Taliban
and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Up to that point,
the sum total of violent incidents between the United States and al-Qaeda
consisted of the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam on August 7, 1998; the U.S. cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan
129. Panel Member Instructions, United States v. Hamdan M.C. (2008).
130. Military Judge’s Instructions on Findings at 2, United States v. Bahlul (M.C. 2008).
(“In determining whether an armed conflict existed between the United States and al Qaeda
and when it began, you should consider the length, duration and intensity of hostilities be-
tween the parties; whether there was protracted armed violence between governmental au-
thorities and organized armed groups; whether and when the United States decided to
employ the combat capabilities of its armed forces to meet the al Qaeda threat; the number
of persons killed or wounded on each side; the amount of property damage on each side;
statements of the leaders of either side indicating their perceptions regarding the existence of
an armed conflict including the presence or absence of a declaration to that effect; and any
other facts and circumstances you consider relevant to the existence of armed conflict.”).
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and Sudan on August 20 responding to the embassy bombings; the bomb-
ing of the U.S.S. Cole on October 12, 2000; and the attacks of September
11, 2001.131 Together, these four incidents involved attacks on ten targets:
two U.S embassies; one pharmaceutical factory; four training camps; one
U.S. naval vessel; the World Trade Center; and the Pentagon.
There is no denying the scale or seriousness of these attacks—to-
gether, these incidents killed some 4,000 individuals and inflicted billions
of dollars of damage.132 But, based on existing jurisprudence and com-
mentary, these attacks did not rise to the level of intensity associated with
hostilities in armed conflicts, despite the magnitude of destruction attend-
ing them. The acts were quintessentially sporadic and infrequent—ten at-
tacks taking place on four separate days and spread over more than three
years. If several weeks of relative calm between clashes was sufficient to
prevent a chain of hostilities from rising to the level of armed conflict, as
the ICTY held in Prosecutor v. Haradinaj,133 then year-long periods of
quiescence between attacks preclude this string of attacks from attaining
sufficient intensity to constitute a non-international armed conflict. In-
deed, such infrequent, instantaneous attacks do not approach the sort of
protracted armed violence considered necessary to constitute a non-inter-
national armed conflict.134
Additionally, these incidents of violence involving the United States
and al-Qaeda were not “clashes”135 as that term is commonly understood.
Instead, these four incidents were short-lived attacks directed by one party
131. A number of other attacks against the United States are sometimes attributed to
al-Qaeda, including the so-call Black Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993,
and the bombing of a joint U.S.-Saudi training facility in 1995. According to the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, none of these attacks is directly
attributable to al-Qaeda. Instead, al-Qaeda or its affiliates were responsible for funding,
training, or inspiring individuals responsible for these attacks but did not direct them. See 9/
11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 59–60. See also Leah Farrall, How al-Qaeda
Works: What the Organization’s Subsidiaries Say About its Strength, FOR. AFF., (March/April
2011). The Khobar Towers bombing in 1996 is also sometimes attributed to al-Qaeda. The 9/
11 Commission Report characterizes the evidence of responsibility pointing strongly to Iran
with some indications of al-Qaeda involvement. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at
60.
132. 2,996 people were killed in the 9/11 attacks; 17 U.S. sailors were killed in the U.S.S.
Cole bombing; an unknown number of individuals were killed in the 1998 cruise missile
strikes on the al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan and the al-Shifa pharmaceutical
plant in Sudan; 224 people were killed in the 1998 embassy bombings.
133. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T at ¶¶ 92–99 (finding that three
clashes over two months followed by periods of calm were insufficient to meet the Tadic´
intensity prong).
134. Cf. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T at ¶48, 49, 135 (describing the 4
clashes between Serbian and KLA forces from November 1997 through March 1998 as “spo-
radic.”); Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84bis-T, Retrial Judgment, ¶ 410; Prosecutor v. Bos˘koski,
Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 175 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10,
2008).
135. The ICTY distinguishes between “clashes,” in which there was an exchange of
violence between two or more parties, and “attacks,” in which one party directs violence at
another party. Compare Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, supra note 15, at ¶49 (using “attack” to
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at another with no exchange of fire or reciprocal hostilities involved. Even
if these attacks could be considered clashes, they did not increase in num-
ber and frequency over time: two attacks on August 7, 1998; five attacks
three weeks later (one target in Sudan, four in Afghanistan); one attack
more than two years after that; and two attacks nearly a year later on
September 11, 2001. Moreover, of these attacks, only five involved heavy
weapons.136 Seven strikes were directed at military objectives—the cruise
missile strikes on the training camps in Afghanistan, the pharmaceutical
plant in Sudan, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, and the attack on the Penta-
gon. The attacks on the embassies and on the World Trade Center were, in
contrast, classic examples of terrorist attacks: unlawful acts targeting civil-
ians for the purpose of advancing a particular social or political goal.137
Furthermore, the U.S. response to attacks by al-Qaeda principally in-
volved law enforcement measures. Although it employed cruise missiles
on August 20, 1998, the United States did not otherwise engage al-Qaeda
with military force or by deploying regular military units until October 7,
2001. The United States sent civilian law enforcement agents to East Af-
rica after the embassy bombings and to Yemen in the wake of the Cole
bombing,138 and it indicted the alleged perpetrators of those attacks in
civilian courts.139 In addition, the United States characterized al-Qaeda’s
attacks as terrorism, and it continued to describe itself as at peace—as
opposed to at war or engaged in an armed conflict—even after the Cole
bombing.140 When describing U.S. responses to the bombing, President
describe Serbian forces striking Albanian villages), with id. at ¶ 48 (using “clash[es]” to de-
scribe reciprocal hostilities between Serbian forces and the KLA).
136. The United States believes that the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant was used to pro-
duce chemical weapons and linked to al-Qaeda. See, e.g., Statement of William Cohen to the
9/11 Commission, March 23, 2004, at 9. A chemical weapons factory clearly qualifies as a
military objective. CLAUDE PILLOUD, YVES SANDOZ, CHRISTOPHE SWINARSKI, BRUNO ZIM-
MERMAN, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 632 n. 3 (Yves Sandos et al. eds., 1987); A.P.V. ROGERS,
LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 37 (1996); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 88 (2004). Thus, although the United
States may have been mistaken in its belief, viewing the strike prospectively, we must con-
clude that it was a strike against a military objective.
137. Cf. UN G.A. Res. 49/60 (“Measure to eliminate international terrorism”).
138. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 192–93.
139. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Bin Laden 132 F.Supp.2d 168 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (No. S(7)98CR.1023(LBS)).
140. Sec’y of Def. Cohen, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Comm. (Oct. 6,
1998) (acknowledging that “Osama bin Laden declared war against the United States” but
affirming that “[w]e will follow the legal route as far as seeking the arrests and apprehension
of those responsible [for the embassy bombings] and bring them to justice”). Even after 9/11,
former President Clinton and his National Security Adviser implicitly described the Cole
bombing as having occurred outside of an armed conflict. Cf. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 92 at 192–195 (“[Ambiguous indicators of al-Qaeda responsibility for the Cole
bombing], President Clinton and Berger told us, was not the conclusion they needed to go to
war or deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban threatening war.”) (emphasis added).
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Clinton publicly stated that “America is not at war” and that it “was a time
of peace” in and around Yemen.141
Many of the other indicia of intensity considered relevant by the
ICTY and other tribunals addressing the identification of non-interna-
tional armed conflict since Tadic´ are also missing from the incidents of
violence between August 1998 and September 2001. Neither party at-
tempted to take and hold the other’s territory, nor was there an exchange
of territory. Civilians were not forced to flee a combat zone.142 Indeed,
there was no zone of combat. There were no efforts to conclude cease-
fires, although al-Qaeda did repeatedly declare war on the United States.
The United Nations Security Council, while encouraging counterterrorism
efforts, was not involved in the putative conflict between the United States
and al-Qaeda in any way comparable to its involvement in the conflicts in
Yugoslavia or other conflicts.143 Despite the many casualties, destruction
and economic loss from the isolated al-Qaeda attacks before 9/11, the vio-
lence between the United States and al-Qaeda from August 1998 through
September 2001 was simply too sporadic to constitute an armed conflict.
Instead, al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States were the very sort of ter-
rorist activities that the ICTY, the Commentary, and other sources distin-
guish from situations of armed conflict that would trigger LOAC.144 As
the United Kingdom noted in submitting a reservation upon ratification of
Additional Protocol I, “the term ‘armed conflict’ of itself and in its context
denotes a situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of
141. William Clinton, The President’s Radio Address (Oct. 14, 2000), in ADMINISTRA-
TION OF WILLIAM J. CLINTON (“This tragic loss should remind us all that even when America
is not at war, the men and women of our military risk their lives every day in places where
comforts are few and dangers are many. No one should think for a moment that the strength
of our military is less important in times of peace, because the strength of our military is a
major reason we are at peace.”).
142. See Prosecutor v. Bos˘koski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 177 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008) (citing Prosecutor v. Kordiæ and E`erkez, Case
No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 340 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec.
17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Tadiæ, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 565 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 139,
167 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); and Prosecutor v. Haradinaj,
Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 49, 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr.
3, 2008).
143. U.N. Security Council resolutions from 1998 until September 2001 concerning Af-
ghanistan addressed, and were clearly cognizant of, a conflict there between the Taliban and
the Northern Alliance. There were no resolutions during that period that addressed or were
cognizant of a conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda, or between al-Qaeda and
any other party. References to al-Qaeda or bin Laden are made only in connection with the
“sheltering and training of terrorists,” or bin Laden’s extradition to the United States for trial
in civilian court, see S.C. Res. 1333, para. 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000). See also
S.C. Res. 1214, para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214 (Dec. 8, 1998). Individual attacks, like those
of September 11 or the embassy bombings, are addressed as “international terrorism.” See
also S.C. Res. 1383, paras. 4–6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001); S.C. Res. 1189, paras. 3,
5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (Aug. 13, 1998).
144. See Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 562.
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ordinary crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in
isolation.”145
b. Organization
Descriptions of al-Qaeda and its organizational structure vary, and the
nature and extent of that organization and its structural control remains
somewhat unclear. Nonetheless, available information suggests that al-
Qaeda comfortably met the basic requirement of “a minimum amount of
organisation”146 by or before 9/11. As originally understood, the concept
of organization simply focuses on the need to have two identifiable sides
to a conflict. By most accounts, al-Qaeda certainly fulfilled that require-
ment, even if it looked and operated differently from traditional rebel
groups.147
Even by the more detailed and formalistic148 standards of later ICTY
jurisprudence, al-Qaeda exhibited many of the indicia international tribu-
nals and other bodies have pointed to in determining whether a group is
organized enough to be a party to a non-international armed conflict.149
For example, the ICTY has identified “five broad groups” of factors for
determining whether an armed group is sufficiently organized to constitute
a party to an armed conflict.150 Al-Qaeda seems to have met all five: (1) it
possessed a command structure; (2) it could carry out operations in an
organized manner; (3) it demonstrated logistics competency; (4) it im-
posed discipline that would likely have provided for Common Article 3
145. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Reservations, June 8, 1977,
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf. See also LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT 56 (3d ed. 1993) (“[A]cts of violence committed by private individuals or groups which
are regarded as acts of terrorism . . . are outside the scope of international humanitarian
law.”).
146. ICRC, Armed Conflict, supra note 50.
147. This is not to say that it was a large, effective, or even successful organization,
however. Farrall, supra note 1351, at 130-31 (al-Qaeda’s membership “included a core of just
under 200 people, a 122-person martyrdom brigade, and several dozen foot soldiers recruited
from the 700 or so graduates of its training camps”); see BARBARA SUDE, AL-QAEDA CEN-
TRAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT POSED BY THE TERRORIST GROUP HEADQUAR-
TERED ON THE AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN BORDER 2 (2010); 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 92 at 66–67 (“Thousands flowed through the [bin Laden-supported training] camps, but
no more than a few hundred seem to have become al Qaeda members.”).
148. Blank & Corn, supra note 15 (critiquing the Tadic´ framework of determining non-
international conflict).
149. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Killings, supra note 128, at ¶ 56
(“An armed group will be considered to constitute a party to a non-international armed
conflict only if it is sufficiently organized. International jurisprudence has determined the
relevant indicative criteria, which include the existence of a command structure, of headquar-
ters and of a group’s ability to plan and carry out military operations.”) (citing Prosecutor v.
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 94-134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugosla-
via Nov. 30, 2005) and Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment ¶¶ 536-
538 (Mar. 14, 2012)).
150. See Prosecutor v. Bos˘koski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 199–205 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
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compliance had it desired such compliance; and (5) it was able to speak
with one voice.
First, the idea of a command structure focuses on the division and
concentration of authority and the hierarchical or other style of provision
and execution of orders. In Prosecutor v. Limaj, the ICTY looked at the
role and operation of the Kosovo Liberation Army’s General Staff as one
factor in assessing the group’s level of organization. The KLA divided
command authority on the basis of geography but vested the General Staff
with responsibility for appointing regional commanders.151 These com-
manders were generally responsive to orders issued by the General
Staff,152 but were also vested with command authority over brigades they
established within their zones of control.153 The General Staff was also
responsible for appointing other important KLA officers like the officer
charged with the “development and professionalisation of the KLA.”154
Significant to the ICTY’s findings concerning the organization of the KLA
was that the KLA was governed by written regulations that established
ranks and delineated a clear chain of command, including directing dis-
semination and execution of orders down the chain.155 Likewise, in Bos˘-
koski, the Trial Chamber emphasized the Albanian National Liberation
Army’s (NLA) concentration of authority in its leader,156 its hierarchical
structure,157 and its use of written regulations158 in finding that the NLA
was sufficiently organized to be a party to an armed conflict.159 The Bos˘-
koski Trial Chamber weighed all of these factors in concluding that the
NLA was “a hierarchically structured armed group, with a functioning
chain of command.”160
Like the KLA and the NLA, al-Qaeda in 2001 was a hierarchical or-
ganization governed by written regulations—in al-Qaeda’s case, a consti-
tution and by-laws.161 It employed a clear chain of command162 and
151. See Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 95–96.
152. See id. at ¶ 98.
153. See id. at ¶¶ 106–07, 109.
154. Id. at ¶ 99.
155. Id. at ¶¶ 110–16.
156. See Prosecutor v. Bos˘koski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 268 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
157. Id. at ¶ 271.
158. Id. at ¶¶ 271–74.
159. Id. at ¶ 291.
160. Id. at ¶ 252.
161. See, e.g., Al-Qaida Constitutional Charter, available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Al-Qaida-Constitutional-Charter-Translation.pdf; AL-QAIDA
STRUCTURE AND BYLAWS 21, 35 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Al-
Qa%E2%80%99ida%E2%80%99s-Structure-and-Bylaws-Translation1.pdf (last visited Nov.
24, 2014).
162. J.M. Berger, War on Error, FOREIGN POL’Y, Feb. 5, 2014, at 2. See also 9/11 COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 67.
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utilized ranks to ensure succession and continuity.163 Al-Qaeda also devel-
oped specialized organs responsible for discrete functions or subject mat-
ter. Whereas the KLA’s General Staff named an officer responsible for
professionalizing the KLA and a spokesman, al-Qaeda established com-
mittees with specific jurisdiction over, inter alia, its political program, its
military program, and its public relations.164
Second, the ability to carry out operations in an organized manner
evinces a group’s capabilities for fighting as a coherent entity, as differenti-
ated from riots or other chaotic, anarchic events. Here, the ICTY has
looked to factors such as a group’s ability to determine a unified military
strategy or conduct large-scale military operations, capacity to control ter-
ritory, capacity for operational units to coordinate actions, and effective
dissemination of written and oral orders.165 Al-Qaeda coordinated its mili-
tary activities, deploying fighters to engage in specific operations166—in-
cluding the execution of global operations. Like the KLA in Limaj and the
NLA in Bos˘koski,167 al-Qaeda not only deployed its fighters—both within
and outside Afghanistan—but also provided them with resources and ma-
teriel to undertake those operations. It disseminated instructions to opera-
tives plotting terrorist attacks throughout the world. Al-Qaeda also
maintained an overarching military strategy—to attack the United
States—for at least five years, while simultaneously contributing fighters
and resources to the Taliban’s struggle against the Northern Alliance. Al-
though al-Qaeda operated several training camps and enjoyed great free-
dom of movement within Afghanistan, it did not exert territorial control
or administration. However, failure to control or administer territory is
neither dispositive nor required as a criterion for non-international armed
conflict generally.168 Indeed, in Kosovo, “the KLA General Staff, also
sometimes referred to in the evidence as general headquarters, did not
have a consistent place of location. The KLA was forced to function as an
underground organisation.”169
Third, al-Qaeda demonstrated all the components considered part of
logistical competency for the ICTY’s purposes: the ability to recruit new
members, provide training, organize the supply of weapons, and maintain
163. Sude, supra note 147, at 2.
164. See, e.g., AL-QAIDA STRUCTURE AND BYLAWS, supra note 162, at 35.
165. Prosecutor v. Bos˘koski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 200 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
166. Cf. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 108 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005).
167. Cf. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 107–108; Bos˘koski, Case No. IT-04-
82-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 278–279, 281–282.
168. Additional Protocol II does require some territorial control, but Common Article
3 does not. Common Article 3, supra note 8 and Additional Protocol II, supra note 18. Cf.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 602, 622–23, 626–27 (Sept. 2,
1998); Prosecutor v. Sesay (RUF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 978–981
(Mar. 2, 2009).
169. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶.
Spring 2015] Identifying the Start of Conflict 505
communication between its headquarters and remote units.170 It recruited
new members from around the world. It put those recruits through various
levels of training and heavily screened them before allowing them to join
al-Qaeda. It also acquired weapons and provisioned its members with
them. It dispatched fighters to serve with the Taliban on the front lines
against the Northern Alliance, often in units that acted as a vanguard for
Taliban fighters. It even dispatched members throughout the world to
surveil potential terrorist targets, plan operations, and report those plans
for approval by al-Qaeda’s central authority.
The fourth Bos˘koski organization factor examines the armed group’s
ability to enforce compliance with Common Article 3. There is no doubt
that al-Qaeda made no effort to adhere to Common Article 3’s key
precepts; rather, directly and repeatedly targeting civilians is its modus
operandi. This failure, however, does not preclude the group from fulfil-
ling this fourth factor. As the ICTY concluded in Bos˘koski:
[S]o long as the armed group possesses the organisational ability
to comply with the obligations of international humanitarian law,
even a pattern of [Common Article 3] violations would not neces-
sarily suggest that the party did not possess the level of organisa-
tion required to be a party to an armed conflict.171
Fifth, a group’s ability to negotiate political arrangements on behalf of
its members with foreign countries or to negotiate and conclude cease-
fires and other agreements are indicators of an organization’s ability to
speak with one voice.172 Although al-Qaeda did not enter into cease-fire
agreements or peace accords, it did negotiate with the Taliban, for exam-
ple, and engaged with representatives of the governments of Sudan,173
Iran, and Iraq at different times. In the course of these engagements, al-
Qaeda was able to establish refuge initially in Sudan and, although it lost
that refuge, to negotiate its extrication from Sudan as an organization.174
It then established itself in Afghanistan, where it negotiated various terms
for its continued presence. Although it violated the terms of its agreement
with the Taliban, this was apparently intentional, and done so on bin
Laden’s command, not as a result of insufficient control over an errant
commander.175
170. Bos˘koski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶.
171. Id. at ¶ 205.
172. Id. at ¶ 203.
173. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 57. After being invited to Sudan by
Foreign Minister Hassan al-Turabi, bin Laden agreed to support Turabi in the then-ongoing
civil war in South Sudan. Id.
174. Id. at 62–64. Note, however, that al-Qaeda lost significant resources to Sudanese
expropriation after its flight from Sudan. Id. at 65.
175. See id. at 65; See also id. at 61 (describing al-Qaeda honoring an agreement with
Turabi to cease supporting efforts targeting Saddam Hussein to improve Sudan-Iraq
relations).
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Al-Qaeda also developed and operated a unified media effort, an-
other manifestation of its ability to speak with one voice. Like the KLA’s
issuance of communique´s to “inform the public of KLA activity, but . . .
also used as propaganda . . . in order to boost KLA morale, raise KLA
standing and encourage recruitment,”176 highlighted in Haradinaj, al-
Qaeda engaged in significant propaganda efforts designed to both inform
the public and boost the group’s international standing. By 2001, al-
Qaeda’s public relations effort had moved beyond merely faxing missives
to London-based newspapers to producing propaganda and recruitment
videos,177 orchestrating press conferences, and even facilitating interviews
with Western media like CNN or ABC.178
Notwithstanding al-Qaeda’s sufficient organization before and on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the lack of sufficiently intense hostilities between it and
the United States precluded the situation from meeting the threshold for a
non-international armed conflict. Although one can argue effectively that
situations of high intensity and low organization should be recognized as
non-international armed conflicts,179 the alternative argument is harder to
sustain and produces problematic results. There are countless examples of
highly organized and peaceful opposition movements, which frequently
can quickly organize mass protests and other actions of civil disobedi-
ence.180 However, suggesting that organization, even coupled with wide-
spread non-violent activity in opposition to the government or perhaps
isolated acts of violence, qualifies as an armed conflict would be inconsis-
tent with the Commentary’s conception of the armed conflict threshold.
Unless and until such organized opposition involves some significant level
of violence—violence that triggers a military response by the government
utilizing the traditional tools and tactics of combat—it does not meet the
test for armed conflict, under either the Tadic´ framework or a more flexi-
ble totality of the circumstances approach.181
176. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 88 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).
177. See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 191.
178. See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 65, 70; BLAKE W. MOBLEY,
TERRORISM AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: HOW TERRORISTS GROUPS ELUDE DETECTION
120-126 (2012); Rohan Gunaratna & Aviv Oreg, Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and Its
Evolution, 33 STUD. CONFL. & TERROR, 1043, 1063 (2010); Henry Schuster, Al Qaeda’s Me-
dia Strategy, CNN (Jan. 30, 2006), http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/01/20/schuster.column/index.
html?_s=PM:US.
179. Blank & Corn, supra note 15, at 1063.
180. See, e.g., Argentina: Information on the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, IMMIGRA-
TION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., (May 1, 1992), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
3ae6abf940.html; Kirit Radia, Thousands To Protest Against Putin in Moscow in Final Dem-
onstration Before Election, ABC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/head
lines/2012/02/thousands-to-protest-against-putin-in-moscow-in-final-demonstration-before-
election/; Timeline: Egypt’s Revolution, AL JAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/mid
dleeast/2011/01/ 201112515334871490.html (last updated Feb. 14, 2011) (Qatar).
181. See GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 36 (noting that Common Article 3
conflicts are “armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities”).
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Beginning in late September and early October 2001, however, United
States and al-Qaeda forces engaged directly in hostilities with each other
in numerous locations around Afghanistan. Frequent and regular clashes,
use of extensive military units and assets, detention of enemy fighters—all
the hallmarks of an armed conflict—were then present. At that time, the
combination of increased intensity and al-Qaeda’s existing structural or-
ganization met the threshold for a non-international armed conflict ac-
cording to LOAC’s traditional and commonly accepted framework.
2. A Non-State Group’s Attack Triggers a Non-International
Armed Conflict
Although international jurisprudence and discourse uses the Tadic´
framework almost exclusively, it is not the only method by which one
might delineate peace and war, and thus LOAC’s applicability to a given
situation. One of the significant features of the traditional framework—
whether the Commentary’s totality of the circumstances or the Tadic´ ele-
ments—for determining the existence of a non-international armed con-
flict is its focus on the exchange of hostilities between two opposing forces.
An alternative approach might focus on the actions of just one of the par-
ties to a putative armed conflict, essentially vesting one party with the abil-
ity to unilaterally trigger a non-international armed conflict and, therefore,
the application of LOAC. A non-state actor’s actions vis-a`-vis a state, for
example, could determine the existence of a non-international armed con-
flict. This Section briefly examines a framework in which a non-state actor
is able to unilaterally trigger the application of LOAC to a conflict with a
state; the following section similarly explores the option of a state declar-
ing war on a non-state group as the trigger for non-international armed
conflict.
In Military Order No. 1 of November 13, 2001 establishing the military
commissions, President Bush proclaimed that “[i]nternational terrorists,
including members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United States
diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and
property within the United States on a scale that has created a state of
armed conflict.”182 Notably absent from the President’s finding of an ex-
tant armed conflict with al-Qaeda was any reference to hostile actions
taken by the United States against al-Qaeda, implying that al-Qaeda, a
non-state actor, had unilaterally initiated an armed conflict with the
United States. In this regard, Military Order No. 1 echoed statements
made by the Bush Administration immediately following September 11
characterizing the attacks as “acts of war.”
If the 9/11 attacks initiated the United States-al-Qaeda conflict, then
either those attacks were the capstone event in a chain of hostilities, suffi-
cient to convert previously isolated and sporadic attacks into “protracted
armed violence,” or the attacks themselves were sufficiently intense to ini-
tiate an armed conflict (and for a few weeks were the only feature of that
182. Military Order, supra note 11, at 831.
508 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:467
conflict). The former theory simply does not comport with the Tadic´ or
totality of the circumstances framework.183 Undoubtedly, the attacks were
massive and caused greater casualties than any terrorist attack in his-
tory.184 For that reason alone, many argue that the Tadic´ intensity factor
was satisfied and an armed conflict initiated because of the scale of the
attacks. But in the absence of any military action or reciprocal hostilities
by the supposed adversary in the putative conflict, this argument actually
boils down to a different theory altogether, one not part of the traditional
framework. Identifying the 9/11 attacks as the start of the conflict thus
rests, ultimately, on a theory that a non-state group’s attack or action
alone can trigger a non-international armed conflict.
Even though the 9/11 attacks seem to be a likely candidate for such a
theory, looking at how this type of paradigm for non-international armed
conflict recognition would operate demonstrates significant practical
problems and undermines key foundational understandings at the heart of
LOAC’s framework. First, purely from a pragmatic perspective, one needs
to consider whether any attack by a non-state group would then start a
non-international armed conflict. The consequences of that option are
self-evident and extraordinarily problematic: an outbreak of conflict and a
spiraling of violence, in direct contravention to the central efforts of the
United Nations and the international community to “save succeeding gen-
erations from the scourge of war.”185 If only some non-state group attacks
trigger a non-international armed conflict, how would we determine which
ones? One might consider the magnitude of the attack, the nature of the
target or its victims, the types of weapons used, the nature of the non-state
group itself, the location of the attack, or the location of the non-state
group. In addition, one would need to decide whether any of these consid-
erations were sufficient alone to trigger the conflict, or whether most or all
were necessary in combination.
Interestingly, these are the very considerations highlighted in the
Commentary and addressed in the Tadic´  analysis. The argument that the
9/11 attacks started the conflict really is simply a claim that that attacks
were an exception to the overall framework, one that justified a different
conclusion than what that analysis would normally provide. The exception,
however, leads to an entirely new paradigm, one with significant conse-
183. Cf. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 37–40 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T,
Judgment, ¶ 84 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 620 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case
No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 561–568 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7,
1997); Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocu-
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 66–70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995).
184. Wm. Robert Johnston (compiled), Worst Terrorist Strikes–Worldwide, JOHNSTON
ARCHIVES, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255i.html (last updated Dec. 21,
2014).
185. U.N. Charter, pmbl.
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quences for both the protection of individuals and for the integrity and
continued effectiveness of the law itself.
Alternatively, one could rely wholly on the magnitude of the attack
and apply LOAC to any situation in which a terrorist attack crosses Article
51’s “armed attack” threshold. That is, any attack by a non-state actor
sufficient to trigger a state’s right to self-defense could trigger a non-inter-
national armed conflict and the application of LOAC.186 Although attrac-
tive in its simplicity, this approach is not lex lata and may also lead to the
impermissible conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello,187 something
that is already occurring in the context of so-called self-defense
targeting.188
If a non-state group’s attack, without more, can start a non-interna-
tional armed conflict, then this direct parallel to state action and interna-
tional armed conflict would essentially put non-state groups on an equal
footing with states. International armed conflict includes “all cases of de-
clared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more [states] even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”189
Any resort to armed force by one state against another or between two or
more states is thus an international armed conflict—but this framework
only applies to acts by states and conflict between states.190 Accepting the
notion that a non-state group can unilaterally start a conflict, irrespective
of the opposing force’s response, means accepting a role for non-state
groups akin to that of states: when a state declares war on another state or
186. See Claus Kreb, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing
Transnational Armed Conflicts, 15 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 245, 258–59 (2010) (discussing the
so-called “congruity model,” under which the threshold for self-defense against a non-state
group’s attack and the threshold for the application of the law of non-international armed
conflict are identical; and contrasting it with the “discrepancy model,” in which “one can also
conceive of a lower threshold for the right to self-defence against a non-State armed attack
compared with the threshold for the applicability of the law of non-international armed
conflict”).
187. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 529–30,
534 (May 28, 2008) (noting that the “basic distinction and historical separation between jus
ad bellum and jus in bello [is] a bedrock principle” of the LOAC); OFFICE OF THE PROSECU-
TOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT
TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (Jun. 13, 2000) ¶¶ 30-34,
reprinted in (2000) 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000).
188. Geoffrey S. Corn, Self-Defense Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bel-
lum and the Jus in Bello, 88 INT’L LAW STUD. 57 (2012); Laurie R. Blank, Targeted Strikes:
The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1655 (2012) (generally discussing targeting strikes); Jordan J. Paust, Self-
Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan,
19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237 (2010).
189. Common Article 2, supra note 5.
190. E.g., Prosecutor v. Duch, Case No. ECCC 001, Judgment, ¶ 414 (“De facto hostili-
ties between States may be sufficient to [trigger an IAC], where these [hostilities] are con-
ducted through the States’ respective armed forces.”); GC III Commentary, supra note 22, at
23.
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employs its armed forces against another state, an armed conflict exists
and LOAC applies.
But a legal regime that recognizes such authority for non-state actors
presents obvious challenges. First, as described above, it extends to non-
state groups a characteristic otherwise reserved to states and, as such, a
sovereign-like quality, elevating them in the international arena. Histori-
cally, states have been understandably averse to granting non-state actors
any of the trappings of sovereignty.191 For example, states alone are com-
petent to declare war; purported declarations of war by non-state actors
are illegitimate and without effect in international law.192 Some limited
recognition that non-state actors are able to act like states in discrete cir-
cumstances is not without precedent, however.  Although the notion that
non-state actors could carry out “armed attacks” for purposes of triggering
a state’s self-defense rights under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter was
highly questionable before September 11, 2001,193 the proposition has be-
come widely accepted if not settled in the years since the 9/11 attacks.194
The question of whether a non-state group can launch an armed attack
goes solely to the state’s authority to act in self-defense, however, and
does not extend to the application of LOAC, the rights and duties of par-
ties under LOAC, or any other similar considerations. Notwithstanding
this limited recognition that non-state actors can affect the international
system in this one erstwhile state-like manner, vesting non-state actors
191. See Dawn Steinhoff, Talking to the Enemy: State Legitimacy Concerns with Engag-
ing Non-State Armed Groups, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 297, 308 (2009).
192. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §94 (2d ed. 1912); see also McDonald,
supra note 114, at 298 (“It seems impossible for the declarations of war issued by Al Qaeda
in 1996 and 1998 to have brought a state of war into being, since the obligation to declare war
in the Third Hague Convention and to bring into existence a state of war merely by means of
declaration belongs only to states.”). Indeed, a non-state actor’s perception of whether it is at
war with a state is not even a factor to consider in determining the existence of a non-interna-
tional armed conflict. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Judge Pohl: The U.S. and AQ were Engaged
in Hostilities in 1775, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 16, 2013, 7:57 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/16/
judge-pohl-the-us-and-aq-were-engaged-in-hostilities-in-1775/ (“Whether a non-state actor
believes it is ‘at war’ with a state is irrelevant to that determination; it is not ‘a factor among
many.’”).
193. E.g., Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Critical Legal Categories
of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 997 (2001).
194. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 227-30 (5th
ed. 2011); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force: Af-
ghanistan, al-Qaeda, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 7, 17 (2003) (discussing the effects of
attacks made by non-State actors); Sean D. Murphy, The International Legality of US Mili-
tary Cross-Border Operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS 109, 126 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009) (Vol. 85, U.S. Naval War College
International Law Studies) (“While this area of the law remains somewhat uncertain, the
dominant trend in contemporary interstate relations seems to favor the view that States ac-
cept or at least tolerate acts of self-defense against a non-State actor.”); Raphae¨l Van Steen-
berghe, Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-state Actors in the Light of Recent State
Practice: A Step Forward?, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 183, 184 (2010) (concluding that recent
State practice suggests that attacks committed by non-State actors alone constitute armed
attacks under Article 51).
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with a unilateral ability to trigger LOAC—and all the concomitant author-
ities it entails—raises the sort of legitimating concerns that led the drafters
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to employ the term “armed conflict”
rather than “war” in the first place,195 and drove states to reject any for-
mulation for non-international armed conflict that suggested legitimacy
for non-state groups.196
Second, this unilateral framework could expand LOAC’s application
to situations well below the threshold for non-international armed conflict
and thus wholly alien to international regulation through LOAC. Internal
disturbances, riots, or acts of banditry—the very situations the drafters of
the Geneva Convention sought to exclude from LOAC regulation and
states seek to address through their regular law enforcement appara-
tus197—could easily be subject to LOAC under a framework that focuses
only on whether a non-state actor has employed force against a state. Im-
agine if a single attack by a disgruntled group launched a non-interna-
tional armed conflict: rather than the comparably restrictive law
enforcement measures permissible under human rights law, the state could
simply call on the military and use lethal force as a first resort. States could
likewise institute indefinite detention without charge for as long as the
armed conflict continues, or employ the manifold other coercive measures
which are not permitted outside of armed conflict. Interestingly, the non-
lethal measures normally used to quell internal disturbances or riots, such
as tear gas or other riot control agents, would suddenly be unavailable to
restrain post-attack disturbances and restore order in a less forceful man-
ner because such tools are prohibited in armed conflict.198 At the same
time, no state is likely to welcome the suggestion that, as a result of a
domestic group’s single violent attack, it is in an armed conflict—a situa-
tion traditionally viewed by states as a sign of loss of sovereignty and con-
trol over law and security.
Indeed, it is difficult to envision how this framework could be accept-
able to states (other than perhaps the state in the immediate situation that
wants permissive parameters for responding to an attack and taking other-
wise prohibited action against a potentially threatening group), judicial
bodies or others in the international community, most notably human
rights bodies. Such concerns may appear less significant to states when the
attack comes from outside its borders, eliminating or certainly diminishing
the responding state’s concerns about sovereign control over law and or-
der and other internal matters. But any legal regime allowing a one-shot
trigger for external or cross-border attacks will quickly bleed over to do-
mestic attacks and disturbances. Furthermore, the very same concerns
about the loss of protection for individual rights remain equally valid
195. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 20–21.
196. See GC III Commentary, supra note 22, at 32, 43.
197. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 36.
198. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 263–65 (2005).
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whether the purported non-international armed conflict is internal or
cross-border.
In addition, from a practical perspective, it may not be clear that the
increased authority found in LOAC offers added practical utility in the
face of non-state actors who, like al-Qaeda until the late 1990s, launch
infrequent terrorist attacks against a state that draw comparatively little
attention. For example, the U.S. government ties al-Qaeda to several rela-
tively low-intensity attacks in the early 1990s. At the time of these attacks,
there were perhaps a few hundred individuals associated with al-Qaeda;
the organization was distributed and decentralized; and it did not control
any territory—it did not even control all the camps in which its members
then trained, nor were these camps used exclusively to train prospective
al-Qaeda members.199 Under such circumstances, a state would likely rely
heavily, if not exclusively, on robust law enforcement measures, including
intelligence sharing, rather than wartime authorities. Employing lethal
force as a first resort against al-Qaeda would have been extraordinarily
difficult, for example—indeed, the United States had a hard time identify-
ing al-Qaeda-linked targets to strike even in the late 1990s, when al-Qaeda
was substantially larger and more developed.200
This unilateral framework also presents the option of a non-state
group triggering a non-international armed conflict by declaring war on a
state. Apart from the lack of any authority for such a possibility in the
international legal system,201 this scenario may lead to the bizarre result of
a state being in a non-international armed conflict without the state’s
knowledge. In fact, al-Qaeda declared war on the United States at least
three times: in 1992, 1996, and 1998.202 It did so multiple times in part
because its earlier declarations went unnoticed or unheeded by the United
States and other objects of the declarations. Suggesting that such pro-
nouncements by a non-state group nonetheless created an armed con-
flict—a situation with specific meaning, parameters and authorities—is
absurd. If al-Qaeda were able to trigger a non-international armed conflict
by declaring war on the United States, the United States would have been
unwittingly subject to the rights and duties found in LOAC from 1992 on-
ward. That result is contrary to the role LOAC plays in regulating the exe-
199. Throughout the 1990s, Afghanistan hosted camps operated by manifold terrorist
organizations. Bin Laden operated some of these camps, provided financial support for
others, and had little or no affiliation with still other camps.
200. E.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 126–43 (highlighting difficulties
in implementing cruise missile and “boots on the ground” initiatives against al Qaeda).
201. McDonald, supra note 114, at 298 (“It seems impossible for the declarations of war
issued by Al Qaeda in 1996 and 1998 to have brought a state of war into being, since the
obligation to declare war in the Third Hague Convention and to bring into existence a state
of war merely by means of declaration belongs only to states.”).
202. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 48 (summarizing a “long series of [bin
Laden’s] public and private call since 1992 . . . singl[ing] out the United States for attack); Id.
at 59 (describing the 1992 “fatwa calling for jihad against the Western ‘occupation’ of Islamic
lands”); Id. at 66 (noting the 1998 declaration of war).
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cution of military operations and in holding parties to an armed conflict
accountable.
3. A State Can Unilaterally Trigger Non-International Armed Conflict
By Word or By Deed
If unilateral action is a possible trigger for non-international armed
conflict, then one might also look exclusively to state action vis-a-vis or
state pronouncements regarding a non-state group. Many thus believe that
the United States declared war on al-Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks.203 Us-
ing this as the governing conflict recognition regime would allow states to
impose non-international armed conflicts on non-state actors, irrespective
of the actions taken by those non-state actors. States would thus be able to
choose to invoke LOAC authorities essentially as a matter of convenience,
inviting LOAC application to become ends-driven, eroding its humanita-
rian protections and undermining the critical compliance and accountabil-
ity functions it performs.
Under the prevailing Tadic´ framework for identifying the existence of
an armed conflict, objective ascertainable criteria related to the actions
and character of both parties involved determine whether and when
LOAC applies. These criteria include the manner in which states respond
to the threat posed by non-state actors, such as whether a state uses its
armed forces against the non-state actor and whether a state describes it-
self as in a war or armed conflict.204 Internal violence is fundamentally a
threat to the government’s authority; therefore, analyzing how the govern-
ment responds to that violence must be a major component of any objec-
tive determination.205 At the same time, the nature of the government’s
actions cannot be the exclusive component, for the very reason that the
Conventions substituted the term armed conflict for war. Any trigger for
the law that rests solely on governmental rhetoric or action will lose the
modern paradigm’s essential objectivity.206
203. FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CON-
STRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA-
RIAN LAW 220 (4th ed. 2011); Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror:
Washington’s Abuse of “Enemy Combatants,” 83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2004 at 1.
204. Some of the Commentary’s convenient criteria focus precisely on this question of
the state’s perception and legal response: “(3)(a) That the de jure government has recognized
the insurgents as belligerents; (b) that it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; (c)
that it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for purposes ‘only’ of the pre-
sent Convention; or (d) that the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security
Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.” GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28,
at 35.
205. Id. (listing one relevant criterion as “[t]hat the legal Government is obliged to have
recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military and in posses-
sion of a part of the national territory”).
206. Id. at 20 (noting that the Convention would apply even in the absence of a formal
declaration of war in the presence of “de facto hostilities”).
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Importantly, therefore, neither of these criteria is dispositive. A state’s
choice to characterize a situation as an armed conflict or not cannot be
determinative because LOAC requires an objective analysis. Although the
problem of subjective conflict characterization traditionally arises when
states refuse to recognize the existence of an armed conflict,207 it holds
equal force in the opposite situation, as seen in the extensive pushback to
the United States’ unilateral conception of a global “war on terror” and
assertion of LOAC authority.208 Similarly, although a state’s actual use of
military forces in fact is an important factor, it is not determinative in and
of itself. States often use military personnel and units in support of law
enforcement and other peacetime operations, and many states maintain
permanent national military police or gendarmerie.209 Thus, “[e]ven if the
armed forces are called out to assist the police, this may not be enough to
convert the situation into an armed conflict.”210 An objective evaluation
of the actions and character of both parties stays true to LOAC’s core
purposes, limits the ability of either party to invoke LOAC authorities
strategically, and works to prevent either party from relying on LOAC to
justify its actions in situations in which LOAC does not apply.
It is here that the distinctions between, and purposes of, the interna-
tional armed conflict and non-international armed conflict triggers are
critical: unlike international armed conflict, where a low threshold is es-
sential to ensure protection for individuals, “[t]he evidence of a[ ] [non-
international armed conflict] must . . . be stronger in order to prevent pre-
mature derivation [sic] from normal human rights protection.”211 A
framework resting solely on a state’s declaration of war or other unilateral
action eviscerates these core purposes by removing the limits and the ac-
countability found in LOAC. Essentially, such a regime would allow states
to use lethal force as a first resort against non-state actors—regardless of
207. For example, Russia regularly resisted characterization of the situation in
Chechnya as an armed conflict, instead describing it as “a tightly focused counterterrorism
operation,” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTERTERRORISM: HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES WORLDWIDE 18-19 (Mar. 2003), even though the Russian Constitutional
Court had already ruled that the situation was a non-international armed conflict governed
by Additional Protocol II. See Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federa-
tion on the Constitutionality of Presidential Decrees (July 31, 1995), available at http://
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-INF%281996%29001-e.
See also A.P.V. Rogers, Unequal Combat and the Law of War, 7 Y.B. INT’L HUMAN L. 3, 8
(2007) (“[O]nce heavy armour, artillery and ground attack aircraft had been deployed in
action, it was clear that the intensity threshold had been crossed and that common Article 3
applied.”).
208. See, e.g., ILA REPORT, supra note 40, at 33 (discussing the chances of human rights
violations when states assert belligerent powers outside the context of an armed conflict).
209. Gendarmeries are paramilitary law enforcement units that retain a mix of military
and police functions. Notable examples include the Italian Carabinieri, the Turkish
Jandarma, and the French Gendarmerie Nationale. While these states organize these forces
differently, the melding of traditional police work with the attributes and duties of military
forces is the common thread.
210. Rogers, supra note 207, at 8.
211. Paulus, supra note 60, at 30.
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the character of the non-state actor in question—as a mechanism to trig-
ger a conflict and all the authorities of LOAC that come along with it,
inviting abuse and undermining the humanitarian principles that underlie
modern LOAC.212
Consider, for example, riots or internal disturbances—situations
quintessentially regulated by domestic law and international human rights
law, not LOAC.213 In those situations, force may only be used as a last
resort214 and the law does not provide for the incidental loss of civilian
life.215 As the Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Killings noted, under
international human rights law, “the intentional, premeditated killing of
an individual would generally be unlawful. Where intentional killing is the
only way to protect against an imminent threat to life, it may be used. This
could be the case, for example, during some hostage situations or in re-
sponse to a truly imminent threat.”216 In stark contrast, LOAC authorizes
the use of force as a first resort, as constrained and regulated by the princi-
ples of distinction, proportionality, and precautions.217 Specifically, during
armed conflict, “it is often permissible to deliberately kill large numbers of
humans . . . even though such an act would be considered mass murder in
times of peace. . . .”218
A state’s declaration of war against another state alters the relation-
ship between the two states, from a state of peace to a state of war, a
212. Laurie R. Blank, The Consequences of a “War” Paradigm for Counterterrorism:
What Impact on Basic Rights and Values?, 46 GA. L. REV. 719, 726–27 (2012); see also Kreb,
supra note 186, at 260 (“[I]n light of the (perceived) threat posed by violent non-State actors,
States seem to be more interested in availing themselves of the wider powers they can derive
from the application of the law of non-international armed conflict (compared with interna-
tional human rights law) than they are concerned by the restraining effect of the ensuing
obligations.”).
213. LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 37 n. 22 (2002). The
Rodney King riots in Los Angeles in 1992 are a useful example “of violence on a large scale,
but in a context which was clearly not an internal armed conflict due to the absence of organ-
isation on the part of the rioters, and their lack of any political objective.” Id. at 37 n.22.
214. Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Apply-
ing Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 52,
74–77 (2010).
215. See Blank, supra note 212, at 727. Cf. Robin Geib & Michael Siegrist, Has the
Armed Conflict in Afghanistan Affected the Rules on the Conduct of Hostilities?, 93 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 11, 24 n.69 (2011) (noting that although “the justification of so-called col-
lateral damage . . . is not illegal per se under international human rights law, [it] would be far
more difficult than it is under [LOAC].”).
216. Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Killings, supra note 128, at ¶ 25.
217. The principle of distinction requires parties to an armed conflict to distinguish be-
tween combatants (or fighters) and civilians and target only the former (the same rule applies
to the distinction between military objects and civilian objects). AP I, supra note 7, art. 48.
The principle of proportionality mandates that commanders refrain from attacks in which the
expected civilian casualties will be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage
gained. Id. art. 51(5)(b). The principle of precautions requires parties to take extensive pre-
cautions before launching attacks and to take precautions to protect their own civilians and
civilian areas from the effects of attacks by the other party, Id. art. 57–58.
218. Brooks, supra note 10, at 702.
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condition with specific parameters in the international legal system.219 It
also triggers the law of neutrality, which governs the rights and responsi-
bilities of third states in relation to the warring parties.220 Such relation-
ships and frameworks do not exist in the context of state versus non-state
interactions, however, making a state’s declaration of war against a non-
state group simply a tool to harness the permissive authorities of LOAC
and side-step other international law protections essential to the protec-
tion of individuals and the international order.221 Consider three examples
that illustrate the dangers inherent in a paradigm that leaves armed con-
flict recognition to the whim of state rhetoric and pronouncements.
First, imagine a state that declares war on a domestic opposition group
in the absence of or in advance of any violent action by that group.
Whereas the state’s domestic law likely protects the group members from
deprivation of or interference with basic human rights, including the right
to life, the right not to be arbitrarily detained, freedom of expression, and
many others, as soon as the state declares war, it can target members of
the group as a first resort based on their status and detain them without
charge until the end of the conflict (a timeframe that also will be solely at
the discretion of the state in such a paradigm). This result is wholly at odds
with the fundamental premises of both LOAC and international human
rights law and eviscerates the protections both regimes hold dear.
Now, imagine the same scenario but the group is located in another
country. If a state can start a non-international armed conflict simply by
declaring war on the group, without the now-required intensity of violence
serving as the key objective indicator of such a conflict, the constraints of
the international law of self-defense will be seriously weakened. Interna-
tional law prohibits the use of force by one state in the territory of another
with three exceptions: (1) consent of the territorial state, (2) operations
authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII, or (3) self-
defense. The last of these depends on an armed attack triggering that right
of self-defense; if a state can justify the use of force in another state by
declaring war without any such armed attack triggering self-defense, sov-
ereignty and the international legal framework restraining the use of force
across borders thus becomes another victim alongside the drastically di-
minished individual rights for both members of the group and those facing
incidental harm.
Finally, if a state can unilaterally declare the existence of a non-inter-
national armed conflict, counterterrorism will simply be subsumed into
war. The targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki illustrates this consequence,
as well as the concerns raised above. Al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen who was a
radical English language preacher and member of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
219. DINSTEIN, supra note 194, at 9–10.
220. Id. at 25.
221. Enactment of a domestic statute authorizing the use of military force—such as the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001)—does, of course, have domestic law effect, but does not change the international
law analysis of whether there is a conflict.
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Peninsula (“AQAP”), was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen on Sep-
tember 30, 2011, along with three other individuals.222 The United States
justified the strike as either an exercise of self-defense or as part of its
armed conflict with al-Qaeda, by asserting that al-Awlaki was an opera-
tional commander who was responsible for AQAP’s efforts to strike the
United States.223 Al-Awlaki was neither prosecuted nor convicted in any
U.S. court.
Debates over the legality of al-Awlaki’s killing have focused on
whether al-Awlaki was a member of an organized armed group engaged in
an armed conflict with the United States or whether the United States had
a viable claim of self-defense in the face of the imminent threat al-Awlaki
posed.224 If the former can be shown, there is a then a strong argument
that the strike was a lawful attack on an enemy operative in the course of
an armed conflict. If, however, there was no armed conflict involving the
United States and in which al-Awlaki was participating, then the strike
could only be lawful within the much more narrowly constrained parame-
ters of the law of self-defense.225
If, however, international law allows a state declaration of war against
a non-state group to trigger a non-international armed conflict, without
any of the other indicia of such conflict, then neither of these considera-
tions would impact the legality of a strike like that on al-Awlaki. Rather,
as soon as the state declares a war, the strike would be unambiguously
lawful—whether or not an armed conflict involving al-Awlaki actually and
222. Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year Manhunt Led to Kill-
ing of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011; New America, Drone Wars: Yemen,
Friday, September 30, 2011, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/
drones/yemen/010-2011 (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
223. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL: APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS AND THE CONSTITUTION
TO CONTEMPLATED LETHAL OPERATIONS AGAINST SHAYKH ANWAR AL-AULAQI, at 20-21
(July 16, 2010). See generally DOJ White Paper on Targeted Killing, supra note 123 (discuss-
ing the general framework for targeted killings of U.S. citizens engaged in terrorist activities
against the United States).
224. Blank, supra note 188, at 1662, 1669; Beth Van Schaack, The Killing of Osama Bin
Laden & Anwar al-Aulaqi: Uncharted Legal Territory, 14 Y.B. INT’L HUM. L. 1, 2, 13,
19(2012); Benjamin R. Farley, Targeting Anwar al-Aulaqi: A Case Study in U.S. Drone Strikes
and Targeted Killings, 2 AM. U. NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF 57, 57–58 (2011); Robert Chesney, Who
May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of
Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT’L HUM. L. 1, 4 (2010). The United States government also ad-
dressed the legal justifications and issues extensively in a series of public speeches by high-
ranking national security officials and by releasing various legal documents related to the
strike. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at Northwestern University School of Law
(Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-
1203051.html; Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the An-
nual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: the Obama Administration and
International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/
139119.htm.
225. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 188. Notably, the United States did not notify the U.N.
Security Council of the strike targeting al-Awlaki as required by Article 51 for a lawful invo-
cation of self-defense.
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objectively existed prior to the strike. Perhaps even more problematic, this
methodology would undermine the jus ad bellum framework because once
the declaration of war created an armed conflict, many would argue that
the existence of that conflict provides sufficient justification to use force
across borders, even in the absence of an armed attack or any other jus ad
bellum justification. Allowing unilateral state action to trigger a non-inter-
national armed conflict leads to the same consequence: even if there were
no armed conflict before the strike, the strike itself would trigger an armed
conflict and therefore would always be lawful under LOAC (assuming
targeting rules are followed and lawful weapons are used).226 The logical
conclusion of a legal paradigm in which a state’s pronouncement or action
unilaterally triggers an armed conflict, and therefore LOAC authorities, is
the emasculation of international human rights protections for peaceful
dissidents, suspected terrorists, and any other persons in the vicinity of the
state’s use of force.
C. Matching Legal Analysis with Operational Realities
Applying the prevailing armed conflict identification regimes suggests
that the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda did not start un-
til sometime after the United States responded to the 9/11 attacks with
military force in Afghanistan, whether in late September with the entry of
Special Forces to fight alongside the Northern Alliance or in early October
2001 with the initiation of the bombing campaign. The start of the bomb-
ing campaign on October 7, 2001 certainly initiated an international armed
conflict between the United States and Afghanistan. One could also argue
that the international armed conflict began when U.S. forces began fight-
ing alongside the Northern Alliance against the Taliban government of
Afghanistan in late September, internationalizing the existing non-interna-
tional armed conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance (or
perhaps creating two parallel conflicts).227 The traditional approach to
identifying the existence of a non-international armed conflict suggests
that the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda also began
around the same time, when U.S. forces and al-Qaeda forces began to
engage directly in hostilities against each other. Because non-international
armed conflict does not exist until the situation meets the requisite thresh-
old—unlike international armed conflict, which begins with a single inten-
tional use of armed force by one state against another—the 9/11 attack
itself could not trigger or constitute a non-international armed conflict
without U.S. action and reciprocal hostilities between the two parties.
226. Note that there is an extensive debate in the United States over whether LOAC
governs the implementation of a strike launched in self-defense—i.e., outside of armed con-
flict. See Blank, supra note 188, at 1680. But this debate does not suggest that the launching
of a strike in self-defense against a non-state group actually is a non-international armed
conflict.
227. Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Remarks on Non-international Armed Conflict, 88
INT’L L. STUD. SER. 399, 400, 414–15 (2012).
Spring 2015] Identifying the Start of Conflict 519
Although an international law analysis demonstrates that the conflict
between the United States and al-Qaeda could not have started before or
even on 9/11—but rather only after the United States began to take mili-
tary action in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda units and operatives—a
broader operational analysis raises additional questions that demonstrate
the complexity of the entire inquiry. The operational considerations ex-
plored in this Section reinforce the need to ensure that law remains rooted
in and connected to pragmatic realities. Effective implementation of
LOAC depends on the clarity of the legal principles, their application dur-
ing the heat of battle, and their credible post hoc application in investiga-
tions and prosecutions. Commanders and their troops can best adhere to
the law and carry out its central tenets when the law, and the rights and
obligations it imposes, are predictable and operationally logical. This same
need for operational clarity applies to the identification of conflict alto-
gether—if there is uncertainty about whether a particular situation is even
an armed conflict, then operational clarity will be obscured and
diminished.
1. A Threat-Driven Paradigm
To explore how the above analysis regarding the start of the conflict
with al-Qaeda interacts with the operational realities of conflict and mili-
tary operations, it is useful to highlight a primary factor in strategic and
military decision making: threat. The threat posed by an enemy, by an
attack or imminent attack, and what is required to disable, degrade, and
defeat that threat is the underlying framework for military planning and
action. Thus, “[a]rmed conflict is a threat driven concept, arising when the
threat necessitates resort to combat power, and extending to wherever the
operational and tactical opportunity to produce a militarily valuable effect
on the enemy arises.”228 A state’s first obligation is to protect its people
from attack; doing so will always require an assessment of likely threats
and a determination of the action needed to respond to or deter such
threats. To this end:
[n]ational security strategy is always threat driven: intelligence de-
fines the risk created by various threats; and strategy is developed
to prioritize national effort to protect the nation from these
threats, including defining the tools of national power that will be
leveraged to achieve this objective. When national security policy
makers determine that military power must be used as one of
these tools, this is translated into a military mission. That mission
is then refined in the form of military strategy, which seeks to
identify threat vulnerabilities and match combat capabilities to ad-
dress them. . . . [T]he nature of the threat becomes the dominant
driving force in this strategic analysis.229
228. Geoffrey S. Corn, Geography of Armed Conflict: Why it is a Mistake to Fish for the
Red Herring, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 77, 82 (2013).
229. Id. at 88–89.
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Understanding this framework for state action is essential to examin-
ing the appropriate framework—and any ramifications from such frame-
work—for analyzing non-international armed conflict recognition.
Although the legal rules and parameters play a critical role in setting the
boundaries for lawful state action in response to such a threat, interna-
tional law in a vacuum will not drive state behavior.230
A threat in this context can take many different forms. It could be an
actual attack, or the threat of a future attack, or similar danger posed to
the nation. It could be terrorist in nature, or linked to a separatist group or
other insurgency, or be the direct result of the actions of another sovereign
state. It is also important to distinguish between strategic threats, which
can result in “significant geopolitical policy shift[s]” if successful, and tacti-
cal threats, which can result in death and destruction if successfully carried
out, but not a broader policy shift.231 In an environment where states are
often “forced to act quickly to respond to twenty-first century escalation
of attacks and meet emerging threats,”232 the nature of threats, particu-
larly terrorist threats, can have a substantial impact on both the applica-
tion of relevant legal frameworks and the coordination of such
frameworks with strategic decision making.
Here, it is important to remember that, as a set of parameters guiding
and governing lawful action during conflict, LOAC is not only a frame-
work for accountability for legal violations. LOAC provides rules and
guiding principles for lawful and effective military action during armed
conflict. At the same time, LOAC does not apply in non-conflict situa-
tions. Given that states respond to threats as needed, in accordance with
strategic and tactical assessments, a system where the law and its triggers
for applicability are divorced from operational realities can be problem-
atic. When a state faces a threat to which it needs to respond in order to
protects its citizens, ensure its borders, or preserve its sovereignty, for ex-
ample, the difference in the relevant legal regimes that could govern that
response is dramatic, as noted above, including the parameters for the use
of force and detention authority.233
230. Indeed, the opposite is true. State practice is integral for the evolution of custom-
ary international law. I.C. MacGibbon, Customary International Law and Acquiescence, 33
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 115, 119–20 (1957).
231. Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, Al Qaeda and the Strategic Threat to the U.S.
Homeland, SECURITY WEEKLY, July 25, 2007, available at http://www.stratfor.com/
al_qaeda_and_strategic_threat_u_s_homeland#axzz3A8zQ34BM.
232. Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 429, 429 (2010).
233. As explained above, during armed conflict, LOAC authorizes the use of lethal
force as first resort against enemy persons and objects within the parameters of the armed
conflict. Corn, supra note 4 at 1352–53. Outside of armed conflict, human rights law autho-
rizes the use of force only as a last resort on the basis of an individualized threat determina-
tion and has no conception of incidental casualties or collateral damage. Corn, supra note 219
at 74–75. LOAC also provides, based on treaty provisions and the fundamental principle of
military necessity, for the detention without charge of enemy fighters and civilians posing
imperative security risks. GC III, supra note 5, art. 4; GC IV, supra note 5, arts. 42, 78.
Outside of armed conflict, individuals can only be detained in accordance with the domestic
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The challenge of matching operational realities to legal analyses is sig-
nificant in the context of the triggering threshold for non-international
armed conflict. Based on the conclusion reached above that the non-inter-
national armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda could not
have started until sometime after the United States began to take military
action against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in late September
or early October 2001, human rights law would have governed any action
the United States took on September 11 to respond to the attacks, deter
further attacks, and apprehend any remaining perpetrators. This conclu-
sion may make sense analytically from a legal perspective, but putting it
into practice operationally raises questions about how the United States
would determine the appropriate action—and the limits on that action—it
could take. For example, based on the determination that the situation at
10 am on September 11 could not yet be a non-international armed con-
flict, one would question whether the United States could have shot down
any aircraft in the skies over the United States once U.S. airspace was
closed,234 on the belief that any such aircraft was declared hostile in a
wartime paradigm.235 Likewise, it is questionable whether the United
States—if it knew that day that al-Qaeda perpetrated the attack and if it
were able to identify individuals as members of al-Qaeda—could target
such individuals with lethal force as a first resort, based on their status as
members of a force declared hostile during a conflict. It is similarly ques-
tionable whether the United States could launch attacks likely to cause
collateral damage among civilians. And yet the strategic, operational and
tactical determinations made at the time may well have led to those deci-
sions as the measures necessary to respond to the immediate and continu-
ing threat. To be sure, the United States could take action in self-defense
against individuals, planes or other targets in order to repel further at-
tacks, but the authority for such action would be more restrictive than that
found in LOAC. If one assumes that “threat drives strategy, and strategy
drives the existence of armed conflict,”236 then one would likely conclude
that the nature of the threat posed on 9/11 was sufficient to trigger a non-
international armed conflict and the entire conflict recognition determina-
tion on that date would change. But not all threats are automatically an
armed conflict, nor do all threats result in an armed conflict—that is the
message of the Commentary and Tadic´ and the entire non-international
armed conflict recognition paradigm developed over the past sixty-five
years.
criminal justice system or in administrative detention, based on individualized threat deter-
minations and where specific statutory authority exists.
234. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 37 (describing that by 10:25 am on
September 11, 2001, the President had authorized the military to shoot down commercial
aircraft); id. at 326 (explaining that all “nonemergency civilian aircraft” had been grounded).
235. This is a different question from whether the United States could have shot down
an aircraft believed to pose an imminent threat at that moment, of course, which highlights
the difference between the law enforcement and LOAC regimes.
236. Corn, supra note 228, at 106.
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2. External vs. Internal Non-International Armed Conflict
This notion of state response to threat as the driving force for state
action lies at the heart of the “story” of non-international armed conflict
recognition. As the “conflict recognition story” proceeds, a state faces in-
ternal disturbances or other domestic unrest, responds with ordinary law
enforcement measures to restore and maintain public order and security,
the unrest increases and at some point the military is called upon to
counter the continued threat from the uprising. As clashes between the
non-state forces and the military continue and develop in degree and fre-
quency, we reach the threshold of non-international armed conflict. This is
the classic story of how a non-international armed conflict comes into be-
ing, as told in the Commentary and through the Tadic´ analysis and its
progeny. But does this story hold true for any and all varieties of non-
international armed conflict?
Although Common Article 3 uses the term “non-international armed
conflict,” at the time the Geneva Conventions were drafted, a more accu-
rate descriptive term might have been “internal armed conflict.” The con-
flicts into which the drafters of the Geneva Conventions sought to inject
some humanitarian norms and some regulation were most often under-
stood as conflicts between a government and a domestic uprising.237 Inter-
estingly, although this may have been the primary or only construct in the
minds of the drafters and the state delegates, the actual language of Com-
mon Article 3 is not limited to such intra-state conflicts, but rather encom-
passes any conflict “not of an international character.” The United States
Supreme Court interpreted that phrase to mean any conflict that did not
satisfy the requirements for an international armed conflict.238
Indeed, in the years since 9/11, the idea of an external non-interna-
tional armed conflict—a conflict between a state and a non-state group
occurring outside that state and in the territory of one or more other
states—has become significantly more prevalent. The United States and its
coalition partners in the International Security Assistance Force in Af-
ghanistan are engaged in a non-international armed conflict in Afghani-
stan.239 Many considered Israel’s 2006 conflict with Hezbollah to be a non-
international armed conflict.240 The U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda is another
type of non-international armed conflict occurring outside the state’s terri-
tory, with some arguing that it is occurring primarily in Afghanistan and
the border regions of Pakistan,241 some suggesting that it is a global con-
237. See GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 26–27.
238. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006).
239. Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca & Stuart Casey-Maslen, International Law and
Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 47, 51 (2011).
240. See Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War and the Notion of
Armed Conflict—A Tentative Conceptualization, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 95, 112 (2009).
241. See, e.g., Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., A Qualified Defense of American Drone Attacks
in Northwest Pakistan Under International Humanitarian Law, 30 B. U. INT’L L.J. 409, 436–38
(2012).
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flict,242 and others averring that it is in fact a series of non-international
armed conflicts based on the situation in any particular country, such as
Yemen.243
The law applicable to these different types of non-international armed
conflict is the same: Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and all
customary law applicable to non-international armed conflict. In the con-
flicts where the territorial state is a party to the conflict, the methodology
used for conflict recognition is also the same from one conflict to an-
other—whether one prefers the Tadic´ elements test or a totality of the
circumstances approach, one can use that same approach across the board
and reach a fairly consistent set of conclusions about conflict recognition
and LOAC’s trigger. Thus, in Afghanistan after 2002 or in Yemen subse-
quently, the description of United States involvement in a non-interna-
tional armed conflict generally rests on the fact that the host state is
engaged in a non-international armed conflict and the United States is
fighting alongside the host state.244 In such situations, one can use the
analysis set forth in Part I above to assess the nature of the parties who are
fighting, the level and intensity of the violence, how the state is responding
to internal challenges, and other considerations, and fit that into the story
told in the Commentary and international jurisprudence of escalating vio-
lence, state efforts to restore law and order, and so forth. In the context of
a conflict between a state and a non-state group located outside that
state’s territory, the story is likely to be quite different, calling into ques-
tion how well this classic story of non-international armed conflict actually
matches the reality of how such conflicts develop.
Imagine a situation in which a state is attacked by a group located
outside its borders, for example, such as an attack by Hezbollah against
Israel. The notion—inherent in the Common Article 3 analysis—that the
state will first use law enforcement to respond to the attack and to restore
public order and security may not be an option at all.245 In such a situa-
tion, the state likely needs to rely on the military to stop the attack and
deter the attackers from continuing their operations as a first step, because
there would be no other option. One might therefore question whether
one of the important considerations highlighted in the Commentary to
Common Article 3, that “the legal Government is obliged to have recourse
to the regular military forces,”246 can still demarcate a threshold for armed
242. See John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, Debate: Targeted Killing: The Case of
Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 175, 190–91 (2010).
243. Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra note 126, at 10–11.
244. Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 690
(2014).
245. Of course, states do use law enforcement measures and cooperation regularly to
address crimes committed or attempted by individuals or groups outside their territory,
whether small-scale criminal activity or large attacks, such as the attack on the U.S.S. Cole,
the subject of the al-Nashiri prosecution. But law enforcement is not likely to be a feasible
response to an attack by military forces of a non-state group, such as Hezbollah or Hamas.
246. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 35.
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conflict if the state has no lesser force to employ. That is, relying on state
recourse to military force could thus turn the non-international armed
conflict trigger into a more instant threshold, akin to the international
armed conflict trigger, when the non-state group is outside the state’s bor-
ders.247 If this lower threshold then becomes accepted as a suitable mecha-
nism for analyzing conflict recognition in the non-international armed
conflict arena, it will then likely be used for conflicts occurring inside the
territory of a state as well—unless, however, extant international law is
significantly revised to embrace a third category of armed conflict distinct
from international or non-international armed conflict.
The distinction between the nature of a non-international armed con-
flict arising and occurring within the territory of the state involved and a
non-international armed conflict between a state and one or more groups
outside its territory is therefore consequential with regard to the LOAC
trigger paradigm. Maintaining a consistent paradigm across the two types
of non-international armed conflict suggests that either the traditional
“story” of non-international armed conflict must apply to externally-trig-
gered conflicts, or that some lower threshold akin to international armed
conflict would be more appropriate, such that an attack like that of 9/11
would trigger a non-international armed conflict. Each of these options
has significant ramifications not just for how we think about the start of
non-international armed conflict—important in and of itself—but also for
what a given approach to conflict trigger means for the object and purpose
of LOAC itself.
First, if an attack by an external non-state group alone, or such an
attack followed by a limited retaliatory response with no further violence,
were considered sufficient to trigger a non-international armed conflict,
that methodology would most likely bleed over into the conflict recogni-
tion paradigm for purely internal armed conflicts. The result would be a
lower threshold for non-international armed conflicts and LOAC applica-
bility to domestic terrorist attacks and other isolated acts of violence. A
lower threshold similar to that applicable to international armed conflict
does not match the intention of the drafters and does not comport with
state perceptions of the balance between sovereignty and the application
of international law, as Part I highlights in greater detail above. For this
reason alone, reinterpreting the threshold for non-international armed
conflict to be more permissive cannot be taken lightly. More important,
247. One commentator has looked at the series of terrorist attacks before September
11th and the 9/11 attacks themselves as following the non-international armed conflict pat-
tern of using law enforcement measures until such measures are no longer sufficient to ad-
dress specific attacks or the threat of new attacks. Thus, “[t]he magnitude of the September
11 attacks demonstrated that the almost exclusive law enforcement responses to past terrorist
attacks were no longer sufficient and that the use of military force had become not just a
legitimate option, but a necessity.” William K. Lietzau, Combatting Terrorism: Law Enforce-
ment or War? in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, 75,
76–77 (Michael N. Schmitt & Gian Luca Beruto eds., 2003). At the same time, this analysis
also fits within the argument that the non-state actor’s attack was so significant that it alone
constituted the trigger for an armed conflict.
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however, are the consequences of a lower threshold for the protection of
individual rights. The difference between armed conflict and a peacetime
paradigm are particularly stark—the legal regime applicable during armed
conflict permits the use of lethal force as a first resort against legitimate
targets and detention without charge, and collateral damage in the form of
civilian injury and death, and damage to civilian property. As a result, al-
though extension of LOAC to non-international armed conflict was origi-
nally designed to enhance protection for individuals in situations of
violence, “given the dramatic development of international human rights,
categorization of a situation as one of armed conflict, rather than internal
unrest, may serve to weaken the protection offered to potential victims
rather than to strengthen it.”248
Alternatively, if attacks by non-state groups did not signal the exis-
tence of a conflict—meaning that external non-international armed con-
flicts only develop when there is an escalation of violence, attempts to use
law enforcement and other non-military measures, continued violence,
and other commonly understood hallmarks of internal non-international
armed conflicts—the result could be a problematic mismatch between the
operational realities and imperatives for state action, on the one hand, and
the legal framework, on the other. If the law does not provide the state
with sufficient authority to respond to threats as needed to protect its citi-
zens, secure its borders, and preserve its sovereignty, states will be left
with two options: refrain from taking action to protect their citizens from
attack, or disregard the law. Neither option fulfills the goals and purpose
of international law and, faced with that choice, states will ultimately view
the law as irrelevant, a result with devastating long-term consequences.
3. Clarity and Predictability: Matching Law to Action
In any military operation—whether occurring during an armed con-
flict or not—rules of engagement (ROE) are essential to the planning and
execution of that operation. ROE are directives to military forces regard-
ing the parameters of the use of force during military operations. ROE are
based on three key components: law, strategy, and policy—the legal
framework provided by LOAC or other applicable international law, the
military needs of strategy and operational goals, and the national com-
mand policy of the state or states involved. In particular, ROE govern the
use of force, setting forth the parameters for who can be targeted, when
they can be targeted, and how. In both international and non-international
armed conflict, LOAC provides for the use of deadly combat power
against all members of the enemy forces, based on their status as such, and
in most conflicts, the ROE will operationalize that authority by declaring
certain groups “hostile.” For example, the ROE for U.S. forces in Iraq in
2009 stated that members of several insurgent groups were “declared hos-
tile” and could be engaged based on status, including Al Quds, the Mahdi
248. David Kretzmer, Rethinking the Application of International Humanitarian Law in
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 42 ISR. L. REV. 8, 21 (2009).
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Army, the Fedayeen Saddam, and the Ba’ath Party Militia, among
others.249 In contrast, outside of armed conflict, ROE do not provide for
the use of force as a first resort, but only for the use of force in self-
defense.250
Lack of clarity about the applicable legal framework—conflict or not
conflict—can conceivably make the process of developing, training and
implementing ROE highly complex and unpredictable. The combination
of rhetoric and action exacerbates these complexities further. For exam-
ple, when the national leadership declares that a particular group is “the
enemy,” is that a determination that the situation is in fact an armed con-
flict and that such group should be considered to be declared hostile? The
impact of U.S. rhetoric on the U.S. conduct of counterterrorism operations
in the years after 9/11 demonstrates that the rhetoric of war can have sig-
nificant consequences for the parameters for state action and the protec-
tion of individual rights.251 When such rhetoric is combined with potential
uncertainty about the threshold for application of the relevant legal para-
digms, it is important to question whether such uncertainty can hamper
operational clarity for the execution of military operations. In most situa-
tions, the state will respond to the threat as needed based on strategic and
operational assessments, and the law will play catch up. Thus, in the con-
text of the U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda and the determination of the appro-
priate legal paradigm, “threat dynamics and strategic realities drove the
law applicability assessment, and not vice versa.”252 Near term clarity may
be the immediate result, but, as the post-9/11 years demonstrate, there
may be no mechanism for law to guide action and to set expectations for
future lawful conduct and decision making.
These operational considerations may lead some to favor one of the
two alternative theories analyzed in Section B above that rest on unilateral
action or pronouncements by a non-state group or a state. A unilateral
trigger could offer greater clarity—as soon as the state declares an armed
conflict, there would be no uncertainty regarding the applicable legal
framework. The United States takes a variation on this approach with the
Department of Defense Law of War Program Directive, which declares
that “[i]t is [Department of Defense] policy that . . . Members of the
[United States military and Department of Defense] comply with the law
of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized,
249. Annex E (Consolidated ROE) TO 3-187 FRAGO 02, OPORD 02-005, 3.B.(1)(A)
(2009); see also GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW IN WAR 507, 507 (2010).
250. INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,
U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 74 (2010); Richard J. Grunawalt, The JCS
Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate’s Primer, 44 A.F.L. REV. 245, 246–47
(1997).
251. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 212 (discussing where the rhetoric of war can have
consequences for parameters of state action and the protection of individual rights).
252. Corn, supra note 230 at 88.
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and in all other military operations.”253 This policy minimizes confusion
on the ground, creates a standard set of rules, provides for training without
the ambiguities of multiple legal frameworks, and generally facilitates cer-
tainty of action for troops and commanders. As such, it has great value.
However, although the United States then uses mission-specific ROE to
provide the necessary parameters to tailor this policy to the legal and op-
erational needs of a given situation, not every military and not every coun-
try has the capability or the political will to do so. Clarity and consistency
may then be achieved at the expense of accurate and appropriate law ap-
plication and implementation—which ultimately undermines the law’s
goals and its effectiveness.
* * * *
Concerns about operational realities and the practical effects of the
law generally arise more often in the implementation of LOAC, rather
than in the applicability context.254 But applicability is intrinsically linked
to implementation; and both applicability and implementation flow into
enforcement. Thus, the right balance between legal analysis and opera-
tional realities must be struck in all three areas. The question of 9/11 and
the non-international armed conflict trigger highlights this challenge in
dramatic fashion. The LOAC applicability paradigm strongly suggests that
the non-international armed conflict between the United States and al-
Qaeda could not have started with the 9/11 attacks. “One attack is not
necessarily an armed conflict,”255 and the facts as of the morning of 9/11
do not satisfy the objective criteria of a non-international armed conflict.
One useful tool for analysis is to consider how 9/11 would have looked if
the United States had never responded with military force. Most likely, no
one would have talked of war or armed conflict—perhaps at most in a
rhetorical sense—just as in the aftermath of the earlier al-Qaeda attacks.
If that is indeed the case, it is difficult to see how the 9/11 attacks them-
selves could constitute an armed conflict, without the state response, an
essential component of the analysis.256
253. DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE 2311.01E: DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM ¶ 4.1 (2011),
available at http:// www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101e.pdf.
254. See, e.g., Int’l Humanitarian Law Clinic at Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Operational
Law Experts Roundtable on the Gotovina Judgment: Military Operations, Battlefield Reality
and the Judgment’s Impact on Effective Implementation and Enforcement of International
Humanitarian Law 7, 10–15 (2012) (discussing ways in which the Trial Chamber’s judgment
in Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011), could have proved detrimental to the military’s ability to conduct
lawful operations and protect civilians).
255. Noam Lubell, Transnational Armed Conflicts?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRUGES
COLLOQUIUM, ARMED CONFLICTS AND PARTIES TO ARMED CONFLICTS UNDER IHL: CON-
FRONTING LEGAL CATEGORIES TO CONTEMPORARY REALITIES, 56, 62 (2009).
256. See, e.g., Abella v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/
97, OEA/Ser. L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 155 1997, http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/Ar-
gentina11137.htm (noting that one consideration in finding the existence of an armed conflict
was that the President “ordered that military action be taken to recapture the base and sub-
due the attackers.”).
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Calling the 9/11 attacks themselves an armed conflict thus effects a
dramatic, indeed drastic, change in LOAC’s very framework for applica-
bility and runs counter to the central purposes behind the non-interna-
tional armed conflict trigger and paradigm. In contrast, the operational
challenges potentially wrought by uncertainty regarding the applicable
framework and corresponding authorities were complex and difficult, but
not existential for the legal framework. The United States could take ac-
tion and prepared to do so, buttressed by the robust authorities available
in the law enforcement paradigm and the clarity imposed by Department
of Defense Directive 2311.01E as needed. Ultimately, although clarity is
vital to success and uncertainty should be minimized, neither should be
achieved at the expense of undermining the law’s central goals and pur-
poses, which is the likely effect of wholly undoing the non-international
armed conflict paradigm.
III. CLAWBACK: “WE WERE AT WAR THEN TOO”
United States rhetoric and policy post-9/11 tells the story of a country
at war that reaches back to before the contemporaneous period of hostili-
ties to demarcate an earlier starting point for the conflict. The primary
reason for this “clawback”257 is to assert jurisdiction under LOAC for
crimes committed before the outbreak of hostilities. Thus, as detailed in
Part II above, the United States prosecuted Hamdan and al-Bahlul for
conspiracy and material support for terrorism dating back to 1996, five
years before 9/11; charged al-Nashiri for the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole
and attempted bombing of the U.S.S. Sullivans, one year before 9/11; and
charged Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four others with war crimes re-
lated to the 9/11 attacks. If one accepts that an objective analysis, as
LOAC requires, leads to the conclusion that the United States conflict
with al-Qaeda actually began in 1996 or earlier, then these assertions of
criminal jurisdiction under the law of war—through the use of military
commissions and the charging of LOAC violations—would be unexcep-
tional. As the analysis herein demonstrates, however, the conflict could
not have started before the United States responded with military force in
Afghanistan, therefore turning any assertion of jurisdiction before that
time into a “clawback.” This Part addresses the validity of a retroactive
conflict recognition, focusing on two possible clawback options—pre-9/11
or 9/11 itself—and examines how well such attempts comport with
LOAC’s basic purposes and goals.
Note that the question of clawback is different from the question of
conflict recognition in some ways because it only addresses conflict status
for purposes of criminal accountability. One could envision a theory justi-
fying a broader temporal scope looking back after a conflict is well under-
way or has ended as a tool to enhance and ensure accountability. As the
257. “Claw back.” WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY “to get back (as money) by strenuous or
forceful means (as taxation),” available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
claw%20back.
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discussion below evinces, such an approach has costs as well as benefits.
However, precisely because decisions about the start of conflict for such
accountability purposes will then influence future conflict recognition de-
terminations, it is equally important to explore the long-term conse-
quences that clawback can have for how we view the entire conflict
recognition process, including looking back for enforcement purposes and
looking forward for implementation and execution purposes.
A. Aligning with LOAC’s Purposes
Effective realization of LOAC’s central goals takes place at multiple
levels: training and dissemination, implementation in planning and execu-
tion of operations, and enforcement and accountability for violations after
a conflict comes to an end. Militaries and organized armed groups must
instruct and train their forces in LOAC’s fundamental principles regarding
the use of force and treatment of persons, an obligation set forth in the
Geneva Conventions.258 Effective implementation of LOAC is essential to
lawful and effective military operations and to the protection of civilians
and all persons in zones of conflict. LOAC also depends on enforcement
and accountability as key components of ensuring that states and individu-
als adhere to the law and face appropriate legal consequences for failure
to do so. The first two of these components cannot be enhanced through a
retroactive restating of the onset of conflict, because they occur either
before or during conflict. Accountability, in contrast, is pursued once con-
flict is well under way and, most often, after conflict is over. Here, reach-
ing back to an earlier starting date can have significant consequences;
understanding how it bolsters or undermines LOAC’s core purposes is
therefore essential for assessing the validity of any framework that incor-
porates a retroactive trigger for the application of LOAC.
At the most basic level, accountability for LOAC violations accom-
plishes the same retributive and deterrent effect as prosecution for ordi-
nary domestic crimes: punishment and, most often, removal from society
through incarceration to prevent the repeat commission of crimes. In the
arena of armed conflict, accountability also has several broader thematic
purposes:
The regular prosecution of war crimes would have an important
preventive effect, deterring violations and making it clear even to
those who think in categories of national law that [LOAC] is law.
It would also have a stigmatizing effect, and would individualize
258. GC I, supra note 8, art. 47; GC II, supra note 8, art. 48; GC III, supra note 5, art.
127; GC IV, supra note 5, art. 144. Common to all four Geneva Conventions, this provision
states: “The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to dis-
seminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries
and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possi-
ble, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to their armed forces
and to the entire population.”
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guilt and repression, thus avoiding the vicious circle of collective
responsibility and punishment at the level of the individual.259
Individual criminal responsibility for LOAC violations thus completes
the continuum of efforts to regulate the conduct of war and provide pro-
tection for both civilians and combatants or fighters during armed conflict:
dissemination, implementation and enforcement. The inclusion of ac-
countability—both crimes and the obligation to investigate and prosecute
perpetrators of those crimes—in the 1949 Geneva Conventions reaffirmed
the essential role of enforcement in LOAC’s effectiveness. As the Com-
mentary explains, “[t]he events of the Second World War led the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross to the conclusion that any
international convention dealing with laws and customs of war must neces-
sarily include a chapter concerned with the punishment of violations of the
Convention.”260
To this end, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 set forth a category of
the most serious violations of LOAC, which are called grave breaches,261
and mandate a comprehensive system of prevention, investigation and en-
forcement. The central components of the grave breaches regime, in terms
of state obligations, are to enact legislation penalizing grave breaches,
search for and then either extradite or prosecute those alleged to have
committed or ordered such crimes, and suppress all other violations of the
Geneva Conventions.262 Additional Protocol I adds to the list of grave
breaches in two ways: (1) it expands the category of persons protected
against grave breaches and (2) it adds an extensive list of grave breaches
drawn directly from the Protocol’s provisions governing the conduct of
hostilities and the protection of the civilian population during conflict.263
The grave breaches regime in the four Geneva Conventions and Addi-
tional Protocol I only applies during international armed conflict, when
the full panoply of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I is
259. SASSO`LI, supra note 45, at Ch. 13, 44.
260. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 584–85.
261. Grave breaches are set forth in GC I, supra note 8, art. 50; GC II, supra note 8, art.
51; GC III, supra note 5, art. 130; and GC IV, supra note 5, art. 147, and include: willful
killing of persons protected by the Conventions; torture or inhuman treatment; wanton de-
struction of property; compelling a prisoner of war or protected person to serve in the forces
of the hostile power; or unlawful deportation or transfer of a protected person, for example.
262. GC I, supra note 8, art. 49; GC II, supra note 8, art. 50; GC III, supra note 5, art.
129; GC IV, supra note 5, art. 146.
263. Article 85(2) of AP I adds the following categories of persons and objects pro-
tected under the Protocol: persons who have taken part in hostilities and have fallen into the
power of adverse party under Article 44; persons who have taken part in hostilities under
Article 45; refugees and stateless persons under Article 73; wounded, sick and shipwrecked
as expanded under Article 8; and medical and religious personnel, medical units and trans-
ports as categorized in Article 8. Article 85(3) and (4) then list additional acts that constitute
grave breaches, including unlawful attacks on civilians; indiscriminate attacks; attacks on
works or installations containing dangerous forces; transfer of the civilian population of an
occupying power into occupied territory or deportation of population within or outside the
occupied territory; or attacks on specially protected religious or cultural property.
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in effect. Although neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II
contains any statements regarding grave breaches, a general consensus has
developed that violations of Common Article 3’s fundamental protections
and other serious violations of the law of non-international armed conflict
entail individual criminal responsibility.264 When the ICTY and ICTR
faced challenges to jurisdiction over atrocities committed during non-in-
ternational armed conflict, both tribunals drew directly from the custom-
ary international law related to international armed conflict and applied it
to non-international armed conflict.265 International jurisprudence has
thus reaffirmed time and again that violations of Common Article 3 trig-
ger individual criminal responsibility, solidifying the international commu-
nity’s efforts to hold perpetrators of atrocities accountable, regardless of
the type of conflict.266 In fact, as the ICTY declared in Prosecutor v. De-
lalic´, “maintain[ing] a distinction between the two legal regimes and their
criminal consequences in respect of similarly egregious acts because of the
difference in nature of the conflicts would ignore the very purpose of the
Geneva Conventions, which is to protect the dignity of the human per-
son.”267 The nature of the conflict between the United States and al-
Qaeda—a non-international armed conflict—does not alter the essential
purpose and goal of seeking accountability for violations of LOAC in the
course of that conflict. However, the difficulty of marking the starting
point of that conflict presents additional challenges to the accountability
process by injecting uncertainty into the process of identifying which
crimes—based on their timing—are suitable for prosecution under a
LOAC paradigm.
Identifying a precise starting date for any non-international armed
conflict can prove to be challenging, and international tribunals and other
bodies generally do not narrow the start of conflict to a particular day.
Rather, most cases and investigations note that an armed conflict existed
at the time of the relevant crimes in order to establish jurisdiction over the
accused and the alleged crimes.268 In a few rare cases, tribunals or com-
missions of inquiry have had to address the specific timing of an armed
264. See generally, EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS
(2008) (discussing at large accountability for war crimes in non-international armed conflict).
265. Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interloc-
utory Appeal on Jurisdiction ¶ 129 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)
(“Applying the foregoing criteria to the violations at issue here, we have no doubt that they
entail individual criminal responsibility, regardless of whether they are committed in internal
or international armed conflicts. Principles and rules of humanitarian law reflect ‘elementary
considerations of humanity’ widely recognized as the mandatory minimum for conduct in
armed conflicts of any kind. No one can doubt the gravity of the acts at issue, nor the interest
of the international community in their prohibition.”).
266. Id at ¶¶ 96-129; Prosecutor v. Delaliæ, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶
172 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 611–17 (Sept. 2, 1998).
267. See Delaliæ, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 172.
268. E.g., Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶; Delaliæ, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, ¶ 192.
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conflict more directly. Even then, as the Libya Commission of Inquiry
noted, “the precise date for determining when this change from peace to
non-international armed conflict occurred is somewhat difficult.”269 Simi-
larly, neither the ICC nor the ICRC identified a particular start date: the
Prosecutor of the ICC referred to an armed conflict in Libya “since the
end of February”270 and the ICRC noted the existence of the armed con-
flict in March 2011 but did not specify any starting date.271
The ICTY faced the challenge of specifying a start date in Prosecutor
v. Haradinaj, where the parties agreed that a conflict existed “from and
including 22 April 1998 onwards” but the Indictment alleged an armed
conflict beginning March 1, 1998.272 Jurisdiction over certain crimes dur-
ing the March 1–April 22 period therefore rested on whether the conflict
existed at that time. The ICTY thus examined “(1) the intensity of the
conflict between the Serbian forces and the KLA in Kosovo and (2) the
level of organization of the KLA from 1 March to 21 April 1998.”273 Of
particular relevance to the instant analysis, the Tribunal found there was
not yet an armed conflict during that period, even though there were at-
tacks by KLA forces, shelling of villages by Serbian forces, and “intense
fighting”274 in at least one area. Rather, the Trial Chamber viewed these
attacks and firefights, including a clash between KLA and Serbian forces
at the accused’s compound, “as incidents that contributed to the escalation
of the tension which had not yet reached the requisite level of intensity”275
to trigger an armed conflict. In contrast, the United States since 2001 has
focused on the crimes it wants to charge and then piggybacked the armed
conflict recognition process onto the charges. With little legal framework
to buttress the identification of armed conflict, the paradigm thus became
one of retroactive armed conflict recognition, or clawback.
B. Clawback Options—and Consequences
Accountability is certainly essential to LOAC—and extending the
starting point of a conflict back earlier in time should expand options for
accountability. And yet such expansion of accountability options may not
automatically be a desirable result, particularly in light of the costs in-
curred. Based on the conclusion that, under LOAC, the conflict between
the United States and al-Qaeda did not start until late September or early
269. Rep. of the Int’l Comm. of Inquiry to Investigate all Alleged Violations of Int’l
Human Rights Law in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, ¶62,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/44 (June 1, 2011).
270. International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, First Report of the Prose-
cutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR
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Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2012).
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October, when U.S. forces engaged in hostilities in Afghanistan, two possi-
ble clawback scenarios exist: (1) to go as far back as 1996 or earlier, or, (2)
in a more limited way, to go back to September 11, 2001 and include the
attacks of that day in the armed conflict.
1. Including Acts Prior to 9/11 as LOAC Violations in
the Present Conflict
Looking back to the 1996–2001 time period, every indication suggests
that no one, with the exception of Osama bin Laden,276 thought that the
United States was in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda. And yet, since it
first charged Salim Ahmed Hamdan before a military tribunal in July
2004,277 the United States has asserted that acts taken before 9/11 that
were part of or contributed to al-Qaeda attacks on United States property,
territory or persons are violations of the law of war, in an attempt—con-
sidered dubious by many278—to assert military commission jurisdiction to
a situation not perceived at the time as a conflict. This approach rests on
two possible theories: (1) the United States was in a conflict at the time
and did not know it or even entertain the possibility; or (2) even if we
accept that at the time there was no recognition of a conflict, it is accept-
able to reach back and incorporate that conduct into the conflict’s penum-
bra now for purposes of a more all-encompassing accountability strategy.
The first theory is addressed and dismissed in Section II.B.2 above. Not-
withstanding LOAC’s emphasis on an objective determination of the exis-
tence of conflict, it is hard to countenance that this methodology could
mean that a state could be in a non-international armed conflict without its
knowledge at all.
The second theory is, one could argue, a more blatant attempt simply
to assert LOAC jurisdiction, whether through domestic military tribunals
or an international criminal tribunal, over crimes that would not be identi-
fied as LOAC violations at the time of commission.279 At first glance, do-
276. See supra Part II.A.3 and Part II.B.1.
277. Charge: Conspiracy, United States v. Hamdan (2004), http://www.defense.gov/
news/jul2004/d20040714hcc.pdf.
278. See Nick Baumann, Obama Administration Fires Up the Military Commissions
(Again), MOTHER JONES (Jan. 20, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/
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ing so seems to enhance LOAC’s goals of accountability for violations,
essential to improved implementation of and adherence to LOAC in fu-
ture conflicts, but at what cost? Defense counsel and amici have argued
that prosecuting pre-2001 conduct as LOAC violations part of the United
States conflict with al-Qaeda raises significant retroactivity concerns.
Thus, al-Nashiri, for example, had no “notice that the laws of war applied
in Yemen in 2000 and 2002. To the contrary, the President’s and Con-
gress’s pronouncements that the United States was not at war in Yemen
provided notice that the laws of war did not apply.”280 Applying LOAC to
such conduct, whether through retroactive application of the 2009 Military
Commissions Act or other mechanism, undermines both ex post facto and
due process protections.281 Beyond these concerns and other domestic
considerations,282 however, reaching back to before a time when any ob-
jective observer—again, a different question from the state’s subjective
political or rhetorical determination—would not have identified an armed
conflict has significant consequences for LOAC and its application.
First, the idea that events years before an outbreak of reciprocal hos-
tilities could form part of that armed conflict introduces much greater un-
certainty into the non-international armed conflict recognition paradigm.
As the history of Common Article 3 demonstrates, “it is easy to under-
stand why leading commentators have opined that ‘[n]o one has been
completely sure as to what factual situations the article applies’ and ‘[i]t is
difficult to know where the border line should properly be drawn.”283
Notwithstanding the more concrete definition and overarching frame-
work Tadic´ and its progeny have since provided, the debates over conflict
recognition in Syria and the contrast between the international commu-
nity’s reticence to recognize an armed conflict there and the quick recogni-
tion of an armed conflict in Libya just one year before284 demonstrate that
the precise parameters of non-international armed conflict remain unset-
280. Brief of Amici Curiae—Retired Military Admirals and Generals—In Support of
Appellant and Reversal, Al Nashiri v. MacDonald at 16 (2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Brief-of-Amici-Curiae-Retired-Military-Admirals-and-Gener-
als-In-Support-of-Appellant-and-Reversal.pdf.pdf.
281. Id. at 18 (“By changing the dates affixed to hostilities in Yemen, the appellee has
retroactively changed the substantive law and Constitutional rights applicable to an accused.
Simply defining a time period as one of ‘hostilities’ suspends certain constitutional protec-
tions and creates criminal liability, i.e., making certain conduct criminal that was not. In
short, the appellee made what was not a crime in 2000 and 2002 a crime now in 2012. The
accused is being charged with violation of 10 U.S.C. §§ 950t(2), (3), (13), (15), (17), (23), (24),
(28), and (29), all of which are triable only if they are committed during a period of hostili-
ties. Simply put, one cannot violate the laws of war—substantive crimes—if there was no
war.”).
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tary Tribunals, CONSTITUTION DAILY (Apr. 10, 2014), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/
04/constitution-check-should-terrorism-trials-only-be-held-in-military-tribunals/; The Ghai-
lani Trial: Justice Served, JURIST (Nov. 24, 2010, 1:14 AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2010/11/
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283. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 62, at 160.
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tled. But debates over the threshold for non-international armed conflict
have centered on where along a chain of connected events LOAC is trig-
gered285—not on whether events years before an unforeseen conflict are
suddenly sufficiently linked to move that conflict threshold back in time.
This latter approach does not simply complicate the analytical process; it
eliminates methodology and process all together, leaving courts, the inter-
national community and other decision-makers with no rational process
for determining the threshold for non-international armed conflict. Al-
though the Geneva Conventions’ revolutionary requirement of an objec-
tive analysis for conflict recognition left open room for debate and some
subjective contribution to the process, the framework enabled general
consensus that facilitated the injection of international regulation into
non-international armed conflict. When this consensus approach is over-
taken by uncertainty and chaos in the general framework for analysis, the
law’s ability to regulate conflict and protect people is diminished.
Second, when the accountability process includes a substantial
clawback, it undermines the clarity and predictability essential to effective
implementation of LOAC during operations. Law is, at a basic level, about
expectations—what conduct is allowed, what is forbidden, how the other
side is expected to behave and react, and so on. When future accountabil-
ity decisions about the threshold for conflict have no relation to under-
standings or expectations at the time of events, predictability about how
those expectations should and will be carried out simply disappears. Here,
we see the consequences of significant disparity between the potential “de-
ciders” regarding conflict recognition. LOAC does not rely on one single
entity to make definitive decisions about law applicability. Rather, there
are many answers to the question of “who decides,” such as national com-
mand authority, courts and tribunals, international organizations, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and the international community. As a look at
the discourse about almost any conflict demonstrates, these various actors
will not all agree on the precise starting point for a conflict, but they also
are unlikely to diverge by more than weeks or possibly months at most.286
In contrast, the idea of clawback to either October 2000 or sometime in
1996 for the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda means that
the military commissions see a starting point of one to five years earlier
than other actors. Unlike the difference of weeks or months between con-
flict recognition views in other situations, this is an extraordinary amount
of time for uncertainty and disagreement about when the armed conflict
285. See, e.g., Documentation, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., http:/
/www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Documentation.aspx (regularly
parsing events and the development of the Syrian opposition to identify a starting point for
the conflict, within the series of UN Commission on Inquiry reports on Syria). See also Prose-
cutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84bis-T, Public Judgment with Confidential Annex, ¶¶
410–11 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2012).
286. The debate over conflict recognition in Syria is a notable exception, although it will
be interesting to see how a future accountability mechanism will measure the start of the
conflict with the benefit of hindsight. Even in the debate over Syria, however, the differences
of opinion over when the conflict started were less than a year.
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started. Indeed, such divergent views create two entirely different conflict
stories, a result that is hard to accept.
These divergent results can have real consequences for the fulfillment
of LOAC’s core purposes. Imagine the effect for the protection of persons
if, far-fetched as it may seem, political and military leaders were to jump
to an armed conflict paradigm immediately upon the perpetration of any
violent act, on the assumption that any acts could be linked to a potential
future conflict years down the road. The notion of the non-international
armed conflict threshold as creating space for the state to address situa-
tions of violence without going straight to war would no longer exist. Le-
thal force as a first resort and detention without charge would be tools of
first resort long before any currently accepted notion of a threshold for
LOAC applicability—with the result of more persons at risk of death, in-
jury and deprivation of liberty. There is no doubt that maintaining an
overly strict and formalized threshold for non-international armed conflict
can undermine LOAC’s core purposes in restraining the brutality inherent
in many such conflicts.287 By the same token, however, enabling that
threshold to disappear entirely is equally, if not much more disastrous for
the protection of persons and the regulation of conduct during situations
of violence.
2. Including September 11, 2001 for Accountability Purposes
Unlike the pre-9/11 clawback, including September 11, 2001 in the
conflict with al-Qaeda for accountability purposes is a much more rational
approach on first blush. Apart from the instinctive belief of many that the
conflict with al-Qaeda began on 9/11 and the consistent rhetoric of the
United States in the immediate and more distant aftermath of that day
that the attacks started the conflict, the pragmatic analysis differs greatly
from that immediately above with regard to the earlier clawback. First, the
conclusion that the conflict began when the United States took action in
Afghanistan in late September or early October 2001 rests on the fact that
those military operations were a response to the 9/11 attacks. One might
reasonably argue that in prosecuting perpetrators of violations committed
in that conflict, it would be inconsistent not to prosecute those who perpe-
trated the gravest crime with the most victims—which also sparked the
resulting conflict—as part of the conflict. Alternatively, if such persons
were accused of crimes committed during the conflict later on, one might
question the practicality, as well as the equity, of trying the same perpetra-
tors in two different courts for two sets of crimes connected to the same
overall situation. Imagine, for example, if Khalid Sheikh Mohamed or an-
other of the 9/11 defendants were charged with a similar crime later in the
fall of 2001: not including September 11 for accountability purposes would
mean that such defendant would be tried for ordinary domestic crimes for
the first attack on September 11 and then tried for war crimes for the
second similar attack.
287. Blank & Corn, supra note 15, at 716.
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From a legal perspective, neither of these seemingly practical concerns
is relevant. The fact that September 11, 2001 is not included in the
timeframe of the conflict does not eliminate or minimize opportunities for
criminal prosecution, as demonstrated by the Obama Administration’s ini-
tial decision to prosecute Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and the other 9/11 de-
fendants in federal court in Manhattan.288 Nor does the prosecution for
mass murder in one situation and war crimes in the other diminish the
retributive effect of either conviction. In fact, under the United States
Uniform Code of Military Justice, crimes committed during conflict are
charged as ordinary crimes of murder, torture, destruction of property,
etc., not as specific LOAC violations.289 Clawback to September 11, 2001
may add neat and tidy packaging from a rhetorical and political perspec-
tive, but it does not lead to any notable difference in the effectiveness of
enforcement or fulfillment of accountability’s purposes.
In contrast, the longer-term effect on LOAC’s overall framework may
well be significant. Section II.B.2 discusses a possible paradigm where a
non-state actor’s initial attack or declaration of war could trigger a non-
international armed conflict and highlights the dangers with such an ap-
proach. Whereas the clawback to 1996 or 2000 is noticeably a retroactive
application of LOAC to earlier events perceived as not sufficiently con-
nected to the conflict to be part of one continuous conflict, a clawback to
September 11, 2001 serves more as a reaffirmation that the 9/11 attacks
started the conflict, in line with the consistent United States rhetoric to
that effect and its actual response. A new framework for non-international
armed conflict is not far behind—a framework that overturns the founda-
tional precepts underlying the existing paradigm. Nothing in the travaux
pre´paratoires or the Commentary mentions, let alone suggests or affirms,
that any single act by a non-state group could be determinative in the non-
international armed conflict recognition process. The history behind Com-
mon Article 3 and consistent practice since its inception demonstrates pre-
cisely the opposite: non-international armed conflict is distinct from acts of
terrorism, internal disturbances, or other situations of violence and only
exists when there is a sufficient intensity of hostilities between two
sides290—which inherently eliminates action by one side only. The 9/11
attacks were monumental in scale, tragedy and impact, to be sure. But that
effect does not mean that the entire paradigm for non-international armed
conflict recognition must or should change as a result. Nothing in the
arena of conflict recognition since 9/11 suggests that the existing frame-
work has changed or is believed to be changed;291 rather, the analysis in
288. Accused 9/11 Plotter Khalid Sheikh Mohammed faces New York Trial, CNN (Nov.
13, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/13/khalid.sheikh.mohammed/
index.html?eref=onion.
289. See 2012 Manual for Courts-Martial, Rule 307(c)(2).
290. See supra Part I.
291. In contrast, the international community’s response to the 9/11 attacks with regard
to the jus ad bellum right of self-defense suggests a comprehensive shift in the understanding
of who can launch an armed attack triggering the right of self-defense. UN Security Council
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all other conflict situations has remained the same, focused on the Tadic´
definition, the factors of intensity and organization, and the totality of the
circumstances approach presented in the Commentary. A clawback—how-
ever short in time—that has the consequential effect of changing the inter-
national community’s methodology for the essential step of law
applicability will have lasting and detrimental effects on the implementa-
tion of LOAC.
CONCLUSION
Conflict recognition is intrinsically linked to LOAC’s core purposes:
knowing when LOAC is triggered is essential to ensuring the protection of
persons and the regulation of the means and methods of warfare during
conflict. Clarity with respect to conflict recognition also facilitates account-
ability, which in turn maximizes law compliance. Just as training and im-
plementation bolster the ability of militaries and armed groups to comply
with LOAC, so accountability for violations enhances deterrence and pre-
vents future atrocities. The efforts to reframe conflict recognition in the
U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda, in the context of the military commission
charges for events before and on September 11, 2001, highlight both the
challenges of conflict recognition in this particular conflict and the detri-
mental consequences of retroactively identifying an earlier start date for
the conflict.
The threshold for non-international armed conflict is higher than that
for international armed conflict, reflecting not only the intentions and con-
cerns of states at the time the Geneva Conventions were drafted, but also
the very nature of the differences between international and non-interna-
tional armed conflicts. Identifying September 11, 2001 as the start of the
conflict effectively imports international armed conflict’s low threshold
Resolution 1368, for example, recognized the inherent right of self-defense against the Sep-
tember 11 attacks and “[u]nequivocally condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the horrifying
terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and
Pennsylvania and regard[ed] such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to
international peace and security.” S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001)
(emphasis added). Similarly, the North Atlantic Council issued a statement activating the
collective self-defense provision in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as did the Organi-
zation of American States regarding its constituent treaty. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr.
4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246; Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., State-
ment by the N. Atl. Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/
p01-124e.htm; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance art. 3.1, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat.
1681, 1700, 21 U.N.T.S. 77, 93; Terrorist Threat to the Americas, RC.24/RES.1/01, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.F/II.24/Res.1/01 (Sept. 21, 2001) (24th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs). Similarly, Australia activated the collective self-defense provision of the
ANZUS Pact. Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of
America, art. IV, U.S.-Austl.-N.Z., Sept. 1, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3423, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, 86;
Brendan Pearson, PM Commits to Mutual Defence, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REV., Sept. 15,
2001, at 9. Several other states have also asserted the same right, including Turkey, Israel,
Colombia and Russia. For an extensive treatment and discussion of the use of force in self-
defense and State practice, see Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012).
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into the context of a non-international armed conflict—with significant
ramifications for the protection of persons and the development of the law
going forward. Indeed, if a non-state group’s attack were to be accepted as
the trigger for non-international armed conflict, we would see a perma-
nent alteration in the Geneva Conventions paradigm, the framework for
conflict recognition, and LOAC applicability. Beyond this fundamental
transformation, allowing either a non-state group’s attack or a state’s dec-
laration of war against a non-state group to trigger non-international
armed conflict unilaterally will result in a significantly lower and more per-
missive threshold for LOAC in non-international armed conflict, drasti-
cally loosening the restraints on the use of force.
A look at the multitude of past and current non-international armed
conflicts demonstrates an extraordinary amount of nuance in the way non-
international armed conflicts develop. There may be sporadic violence, a
changing and developing state response, and a growing and coalescing
group that opposes the government— in effect, a myriad of remarkably
fluid and dynamic situations. In few, if any, non-international armed con-
flicts is there a well-formed group that opposes a government and has a
substantial military capability and then, in an instant, a full-blown conflict
starts. And yet, in a slightly over-simplified way, that is how international
armed conflict starts. Superimposing this state versus state, one-shot trig-
ger onto a non-international armed conflict scenario is far too simplistic. It
misrepresents the threshold established by Common Article 3 and fleshed
out over time through international jurisprudence and state practice. More
importantly, the reluctance to recognize an armed conflict upon a single
non-state group attack has an essential protective purpose.
A world in which a single anti-government violent act triggers an
armed conflict and, with it, the government’s right to use force as a first
resort against all persons it identifies as “the enemy” is a frightening pros-
pect. Such a framework is a recipe for escalating violence and overly ex-
panded government powers neither foreseen nor desired by the drafters of
the Geneva Conventions, and emasculates state obligations to protect
human rights even while taking action to maintain law and order. Rhetoric
and policy surely lead to and benefit from a determination that the 9/11
attacks started the conflict—or even that events before 9/11 were part of
the conflict. But the comprehensive legal framework for conflict recogni-
tion rejects the “easy” answer of unilateral non-state or state action, and
instead demands a nuanced and principled analysis of the totality of the
circumstances, the operational imperatives, and the core purposes of
LOAC.

